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ABSTRACT 
We show how frictions and continuous transfers jointly affect equilibria in a model of 
matching in trading networks. Our model incorporates distortionary frictions such as 
transaction taxes, bargaining costs, and incomplete markets. When contracts are fully 
substitutable for firms, competitive equilibria exist and coincide with outcomes that 
satisfy a cooperative stability property called trail stabity. In the presence of frictions, 
competitive equilibria might be neither stable nor (constrained) Pareto-efficient. In the 
absence of frictions, on the other hand, competitive equilibria are stable and in the 
core, even if utility is imperfectly transferable. 
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ÖSSZEFOGLALÓ 
Megmutatjuk, hogy a kereskedelmi hálózat modellben mind a súrlódás, mind a 
folytonos átválthatóság megléte hogyan befolyásolja a közgazdasági egyensúlyt. 
Modellünkben a torzítást eredményező súrlódási tényezők lehetnek tranzakciók után 
fizetendő illetékek, az alkufolyamathoz kapcsolódó költségek vagy hiányos piacok. 
Amennyiben a modellben szereplő cégek számára az egyes szerződések korlátlanul 
helyettesíthetők, úgy mindig létezik közgazdasági egyensúly, és megegyezik a trail-
stabilitásnak elnevezett kooperatív stabilitási tulajdonságot teljesítő 
végeredményekkel. Súrlódás megléte esetén azonban a közgazdasági egyensúlyi sem 
nem feltétlenül stabil, sem pedig nem feltétlenül Pareto-optimális. Súrlódás hiányában 
azonban a közgazdasági egyensúly akkor is stabil és mag-tulajdonságú, ha a hasznosság 
nem tökéletesen átváltható. 
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Trading networks with frictions
TAMÁS FLEINER RAVI JAGADEESAN ZSUZSANNA JANKÓ ALEXANDER TEYTELBOYM
We show how frictions and continuous transfers jointly aect equilibria in a model of matching in trading networks. Our model
incorporates distortionary frictions such as transaction taxes, bargaining costs, and incomplete markets. When contracts are fully
substitutable for rms, competitive equilibria exist and coincide with outcomes that satisfy a cooperative stability property called trail
stability. In the presence of frictions, competitive equilibria might be neither stable nor (constrained) Pareto-ecient. In the absence of
frictions, on the other hand, competitive equilibria are stable and in the core, even if utility is imperfectly transferable.
1 INTRODUCTION
Interdependence and specialization of production are central features of the modern economy. Many rms have complex,
bilateral relationships with dozens of buyers and suppliers. The terms of these relationships are typically encoded in
complex contracts that specify goods traded or services rendered, delivery dates, penalties for non-completion, and, of
course, prices. Markets that involve heterogeneous and highly specialized contracts, talented workers, or sophisticated
machines can often be concentrated and thin. In such markets, it is à priori implausible to assume that agents act as
price-takers.
Models of matching with contracts, inspired by the work of Gale and Shapley [1962], elegantly capture interaction in
thin markets [Crawford and Knoer, 1981, Hateld and Milgrom, 2005, Kelso and Crawford, 1982, Roth, 1984]. Matching
models do not typically assume that agents are price-takers: instead, agents are free to engage in highly specic
contracts and rely on the consent of counterparties to maintain contractual relationships. The equilibrium concepts
employed in the matching literature, such as stability, require that recontracting should not be protable. Unlike typical
general equilibrium models, matching models can also incorporate indivisibilities, which are often present in thin
markets. Finally, matching models capture frictions, such as transaction taxes [Dupuy et al., 2017], bargaining costs
[Galichon et al., 2018], and the incompleteness of the nancial market [Jagadeesan, 2017].1
While cooperative solution concepts are well-founded thin markets, competitive solution concepts are often more
natural in thick markets [Edgeworth, 1881, Kelso and Crawford, 1982]. Nevertheless, competitive and cooperative
solution concepts are both appealing to some extent in markets of all sizes. For example, competitive equilibrium could
be a reasonable solution concept even in thin markets because it does not require rms to coordinate directly with one
another. Cooperative solutions, on the other hand, oer a credible foundation for the analysis of thick markets that
cannot clear—for example, due to price controls.2
This paper establishes an equivalence between competitive equilibrium and an intuitive stability concept in markets
with frictions. As we will argue, our equivalence result provides new cooperative foundations for competitive equilibrium
and competitive foundations for our stability concept. We also show how frictions matter for the connection between
competitive and cooperative solution concepts.
We focus on trading networks to capture complex production linkages. Following Ostrovsky [2008], Hateld and
Kominers [2012], Hateld et al. [2013], and Fleiner et al. [2018b], we assume that agents interact via an exogenously
1The nancial market is incomplete if agents suer from uninsurable risk—that is, if there is some Arrow [1953] security that is absent or cannot be
traded without transaction costs.
2See Drèze [1975], Hateld et al. [2012, 2016], Andersson and Svensson [2014], and Herings [2015].
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specied set of bilateral trades—which specify who is trading, what good or service is being traded, and any non-
pecuniary parameters of exchange. Trades have directions that correspond to the ow of goods: upstream trades
represent purchases and downstream trades represent sales. In a market outcome, transfers are made for every realized
trade, encapsulating the role of money in the economy [Hateld et al., 2013]. We summarize outcomes as a set of
realized contracts, each of which species a trade and a price.
Our model can capture distortionary frictions in reduced form. Formally, we allow agents to place dierent values
on transfers associated to dierent trades. Intuitively, when frictions are present, receiving one unit of transfer may not
fully oset the cost of paying one unit of transfer. For example, transaction taxes and bargaining costs cause there to be
a wedge between payment and receipt. There might also be wedges between forms of transfer when nancial markets
are incomplete. For example, if transfers are in trade credit that is subject to imperfectly-insurable default risk, then
creditors value payments less than debtors. Similarly, if currency markets are imperfect, then rms may value local
currency more than foreign currency. However, like in general equilibrium models, we assume that transfers associated
to trades are one-dimensional, so that each realized trade has a well-dened price. This uni-dimensionality condition
rules out partial nancing of purchases with trade credit and requires that each trade is priced in a single currency
[Jagadeesan, 2017].
Our rst main result provides sucient conditions for the existence of competitive equilibria. The key assumption is
that preferences over contracts are fully substitutable [Hateld and Kominers, 2012, Hateld et al., 2013, Ostrovsky,
2008]—that is, that upstream (resp. downstream) trades are grossly substitutable for each other, and that upstream and
downstream trades are grossly complementary to one another. Full substitutability can be regarded as the requirement
that the goods that ow in trades are grossly substitutable [Baldwin and Klemperer, 2018, Hateld et al., 2019]. In our
model, full substitutability and a mild regularity condition together ensure that competitive equilibria exist.3
To relate the competitive and cooperative approaches to the analysis of markets with frictions, we rst explore
cooperative interpretations of competitive equilibria. We show that competitive equilibrium outcomes are always
trail-stable—i.e., immune to sequential deviations in which a rm that receives an upstream (resp. downstream) contract
oer can either accept the oer outright or make an additional downstream (resp. upstream) contract oer [Fleiner et al.,
2018b]. Trail stability is a natural extension of Gale and Shapley’s (1962) pairwise stability property to trading networks.
Other solution concepts in matching theory are stability (in the sense of Hateld et al. [2013])—which requires that
there is no group of rms that can commit to recontracting among themselves (possibly while dropping some existing
contracts)—and the core. However, in the presence of frictions, competitive equilibrium outcomes are typically neither
stable nor in the core.
Stable and trail-stable outcomes, on the other hand, have competitive interpretations. We say that an outcome lifts to
a competitive equilibrium if the outcome can be supported by competitive equilibrium prices—as an outcome already
species the prices of realized trades, showing that an outcome lifts to a competitive equilibrium amounts to specifying
equilibrium prices for unrealized trades. We show that trail-stable and stable outcomes lift to competitive equilibria
under full substitutability and regularity conditions.4 In the presence of frictions, therefore, the trail stability and
competitive equilibrium solution concepts are essentially equivalent, but they both dier from stability.
3As Hateld and Kominers [2012] and Hateld et al. [2013] show, full substitutability is necessary (in the maximal domain sense) for the existence of
equilibria in trading networks.
4Hateld et al. [2013] show that stable outcomes lift to competitive equilibria under full substitutability in transferable utility economies. Our results
apply even in the presence of frictions and income eects.
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Fig. 1. Summary of our results. The squiggly arrows represent existence results, the ordinary arrows represent relationships
between solution concepts, and the dashed arrows shows liing results. Arrows are labeled by the hypotheses of the corresponding
results. FS stands for full substitutability (see Assumption 1), “Bounded CVs" stands for “bounded compensating variations" (see
Assumptions 2 and 2′), and “bounded WTP" stands for “bounded willingness to pay" (see Assumption 3).
The relationship between stability and competitive equilibria changes dramatically in the absence of distortionary
frictions. In this case, there are no wedges between payments and receipts, and we say that the market is complete.5
Completeness ensures that competitive equilibrium outcomes are strongly group stable (in the sense ofHateld et al.
[2013]), hence in particular stable, in the core, and Pareto-ecient. As a result, the (strong group) stability, trail stability,
and competitive equilibrium solution concepts are all essentially equivalent in complete markets. Figure 1 summarizes
our results.
Taken as a whole, our results provide new foundations for competitive equilibrium and trail stability in thin and
thick markets. Our competitive interpretation of trail stability guarantees that, as long rms coordinate on a trail-stable
outcome, they act as if they take prices as given. Hence, even though price-taking may not be a reasonable assumption
per se in thin markets, it is actually a consequence of cooperative behavior. On the other hand, our cooperative
interpretation of competitive equilibrium guarantees that rms cannot improve upon equilibrium outcomes even by
deviations along trails. Therefore, while it may be dicult for rms to coordinate with each other in thick markets, any
equilibrium will yield a trail-stable outcome as long as rms take prices as given.
From an applied perspective, our model may be of interest to structural econometricians. Recent work on estimation
in matching markets with transfers has focused on frictionless trading networks [Fox, 2017, 2018, Fox et al., 2018]
and two-sided markets with frictions [Cherchye et al., 2017, Galichon et al., 2018].6 Since our model allows for both
frictions and interconnectedness, it opens up new applications. Consider, for example, the housing market. Houses are
highly dierentiated and agents might act as both buyers and sellers, making the housing market an interconnected
trading network. There is no vertical supply chain structure. Interactions in the housing market suer from bargaining
5Our completeness condition is analogous to the requirement in general equilibrium theory that the nancial market is complete. Indeed, when the
nancial market is rich enough (i.e., all Arrow [1953] securities are present), agents’ marginal rates of substitution between forms of transfer are
equalized in equilibrium. By renormalizing the currency units of each form of transfer, we can assume that all agents are indierent between all forms of
transfer—see Section 6.
6Other papers have focused on structural estimation in two-sided matching markets with transferable utility. See, for example, Choo and Siow [2006],
Fox [2010], Chiappori, Orece, and Quintana-Domeque [2012], Fox and Bajari [2013], Dupuy and Galichon [2014], Galichon and Salanié [2014], and
Chiappori, Salanié, and Weiss [2017].
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frictions and other transaction costs—such as real estate agent fees and stamp duty land taxes [Hilber and Lyytikäinen,
2017]—making utility imperfectly transferable.7 Structural methods based on our model would allow the econometrician
to partially identify agents’ preferences by assuming that the observed market outcome is trail-stable—or, equivalently,
associated to a competitive equilibrium.
Most previous models of matching in trading networks impose signicant additional conditions on the structure
of the trading network, the space of contracts, or preferences. Ostrovsky [2008], Westkamp [2010], and Hateld and
Kominers [2012] derive existence and structural results for acyclic networks, which cannot contain “horizontal" trade
between intermediaries.8 Hateld et al. [2018] and Fleiner et al. [2018b] extend the analysis of Ostrovsky [2008] to
general trading networks. However, Ostrovsky [2008], Westkamp [2010], Hateld and Kominers [2012], and Fleiner et al.
[2018b] all assume that there are nitely many contracts, ruling out continuous or unbounded prices and precluding
comparisons between the matching and general equilibrium approaches. Hateld et al. [2013] consider general trading
networks with continuous prices and technological constraints, but assume that utility is perfectly transferable, ruling
out distortionary frictions and income eects.9 In a recent paper, Hateld et al. [2018] introduce continuous prices
into discrete models of matching in trading networks [Fleiner et al., 2018b, Hateld and Kominers, 2012, Ostrovsky,
2008, Westkamp, 2010] while allowing for technological constraints [Hateld et al., 2013]. Our model specializes that
of Hateld et al. [2018] to accommodate general equilibrium analysis. Hateld et al. [2018] show when chain stable
outcomes and stable outcomes—neither of which exist in our model—coincide. In contrast, we prove existence results
and relate competitive equilibrium to trail stability and stability.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3 explains how our model captures frictions
and describes leading examples. Section 4 presents sucient conditions for the existence of competitive equilibrium.
Section 5 denes trail stability and stability and relates these concepts to competitive equilibrium. Section 6 analyzes
complete markets. Section 7 concludes. Appendix A specializes to the case of acyclic networks. Appendix B formulates
an equivalent denition of full substitutability. The Supplementary Appendices present the omitted proofs and additional
examples.
2 MODEL
Our model is based on that of Hateld et al. [2018] but requires that prices be continuous and unbounded.
2.1 Firms and contracts
There is a nite set 퐹 of rms and a nite set Ω of trades. Each trade 휔 ∈ Ω is associated to a buyer b(휔) ∈ 퐹 and a seller
s(휔) ∈ 퐹 . Trades specify what is being exchanged as well as any non-pecuniary contract terms [Hateld et al., 2013].
A contract is a pair (휔, 푝휔 ) that consists of a trade 휔 and a price 푝휔 ∈ R. Thus, the set of contracts is 푋 = Ω × R. Let
휏 : 푋 → Ω be the projection that recovers the trade associated with a contract. An outcome is a set 푌 ⊆ 푋 such that
each trade is associated with at most one price in 푌—formally, |휏 (푌 ) | = |푌 |.
Given a set Ξ ⊆ Ω of trades and a rm 푓 ∈ 퐹, let Ξ→푓 denote the set of trades in Ξ in which 푓 acts as a buyer, let
Ξ푓→ denote the set of trades in Ξ in which 푓 acts as a seller, and let Ξ푓 = Ξ→푓 ∪ Ξ푓→ denote the set of trades in
7In contrast, Shapley and Shubik [1972] and Hateld et al. [2013] assume that utility is perfectly transferable, while Shapley and Scarf [1974] and
Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez [1999] assume that utility is non-transferable.
8In Appendix A, we impose acyclicity and show that trail-stable, stable, and competitive equilibrium outcomes coincide under full substitutability and a
regularity condition.
9Hateld et al. [2013] allow for xed transaction costs, such as shipping costs and lump-sum transaction taxes, but not variable transaction taxes and the
other frictions considered in this paper.
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Ξ in which 푓 is involved (either as a buyer or as a seller). For a set 푌 ⊆ 푋 of contracts, we dene 푌→푓 , 푌푓→, and 푌푓
analogously.
An arrangement is a pair [Ξ;푝] of a set of trades Ξ ⊆ Ω and a price vector 푝 ∈ RΩ . Given an arrangement [Ξ;푝] ,
dene an associated outcome 휅 ( [Ξ;푝]) ⊆ 푋 by
휅 ( [Ξ;푝]) = {(휔, 푝휔 ) | 휔 ∈ Ξ}.
That is, 휅 ( [Ξ;푝]) is the outcome at which the trades in Ξ are realized at prices given by 푝 . Note that arrangements
specify prices even for unrealized trades.
2.2 Utility functions and transfers
Each rm’s utility depends only on the trades that involve it and on the transfers that it pays and receives. Formally,
rm 푓 has a utility function 푢 푓 : P(Ω푓 ) × RΩ푓 → R ∪ {−∞}.10 We assume that 푢 푓 is continuous and that
푡 ≤ 푡 ′ =⇒ 푢 푓 (Ξ, 푡) ≤ 푢 푓 (Ξ, 푡 ′)
with equality only if 푢 푓 (Ξ, 푡) = −∞, so that monetary transfers are relevant to rms whenever their utility is nite.
We also assume that 푢 푓 (∅, 0) ∈ R, so that money is relevant to rms at any outcome that they prefer to autarky. The
transferable utility trading network model of Hateld et al. [2013] is recovered when
푢 푓 (Ξ, 푡) = 푣 푓 (Ξ) +
∑
휔 ∈Ω푓
푡휔
for some valuation function 푣 푓 : P(푋푓 ) → R ∪ {−∞}.
To analyze competitive equilibria, we need to consider rms’ demands at any given price vector. Prices give rise to
transfers in the following manner. Firms receive no transfer for a trade if they do not agree to the trade. Firms receive
transfers equal to the prices of any realized sales (downstream trades) and pays transfers equal to the prices of any
realized purchases (upstream trades). Maximizing utility at a price vector 푝 ∈ RΩ푓 gives rise to a collection of sets of
demanded trades
퐷 푓 (푝) = arg max
Ξ⊆Ω푓
푢 푓
(
Ξ,
(
푝Ξ푓→ , (−푝)Ξ→푓 , 0Ω푓rΞ
))
.
Thus, 퐷 푓 is the demand correspondence of rm 푓 .
As is typical in matching theory (see Aygün and Sönmez [2013]), we also need to consider rms’ choices from sets of
available contracts. Given an outcome 푌 ⊆ 푋푓 , dene 푈 푓 (푌 ) = 푢 푓 (휏 (푌 ), 푡), where 푡휔 is the transfer associated with
trade 휔 .11 Since prices are continuous, rms might be indierent between certain outcomes. We therefore dene the
choice correspondence 퐶 푓 : P(푋푓 ) ⇒ P(푋푓 ) by
퐶 푓 (푌 ) = arg max
outcomes 푍 ⊆푌
푈 푓 (푍 ) .
10We write P(푍 ) for the power set of a set 푍 .
11Formally, we write
푡휔 =

0 if 휔 ∉ 휏 (푌 )
푝휔 if (휔, 푝휔 ) ∈ 푌푓→
−푝휔 if (휔, 푝휔 ) ∈ 푌→푓
.
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2.3 Competitive equilibrium
In a competitive equilibrium, rms act as price-takers and the market for each trade clears—either a trade is demanded
(at the specied price) by both the buyer and the seller or it is demanded by neither. As in Hateld et al. [2013], in order
to fully specify a competitive equilibrium, we need to assign prices to all trades, including ones that are not realized.
Denition 1. An arrangement [Ξ;푝] is a competitive equilibrium if Ξ푓 ∈ 퐷 푓 (푝Ω푓 ) for all 푓 .
As interchangeable trades with dierent counterparties can be priced dierently, our competitive equilibria have
personalized prices (as in Hateld et al. [2013]).12 We call an outcome퐴 a competitive equilibrium outcome if퐴 = 휅 ( [Ξ;푝])
for some competitive equilibrium [Ξ;푝].
3 DISTORTIONARY FRICTIONS
In our model, rms may value transfers from dierent trades dierently, so that a unit of 푡휔 might be worth less to the
rm than a unit of 푡휔′ .13 This feature allows our model to capture (in a reduced form) distortionary frictions, such
as variable transaction taxes, bargaining costs, and certain forms of nancial market incompleteness. This section
illustrates exactly how our model can capture these distortionary frictions and how they in turn aect competitive
equilibria.
3.1 Transaction taxes
Suppose, for example, that 휆 proportion of any transfer must be paid to the government. We assume that the recipient of
the transfer pays the proportional transaction tax—this assumption is without loss of generality. Thus, the net transfer
received or paid by a rm for a trade 휔 is
푡˜휔 =

(1 − 휆)푡휔 if 푡휔 ≥ 0
푡휔 if 푡휔 < 0
,
where 푡휔 is the gross transfer. Hence, when 푡휔 ≥ 0, the rm is a recipient of the transfer and receives (1 − 휆)푡휔 ;
when 푡휔 < 0, the rm is a payer and pays 푡휔 in full. As a result, if rm 푓 has quasilinear preferences and valuation
푣 푓 : P(푋푓 ) → R ∪ {−∞}, then the utility function 푢 푓 is
푢 푓 (Ξ) = 푣 푓 (Ξ) +
∑
휔 ∈Ω푓
푡˜휔 .
When 휆 < 1 and 푣 푓 (∅) ∈ R, the utility function 푢 푓 satises our conditions on preferences (i.e., it is continuous and
satises the requisite monotonicity conditions). Note that transaction taxes make utility imperfectly transferable even
if preferences are quasilinear.
We can model transaction taxes similarly even in the presence of income eects. If rm 푓 has utility function 푢̂ 푓
before taxes, then the net-of-tax utility function is
푢 푓 (Ξ, 푡) = 푢̂ 푓 (Ξ, 푡˜ ) .
More generally, our framework can capture non-linear transaction taxes and subsidies. Suppose that Λ휔 ( |푝휔 |) tax
must be paid on a transfer of size |푝휔 | for trade 휔. If rm 푓 has utility function 푢̂ 푓 before taxes, then the net-of-tax
12For example, trades of the same good with dierent counterparties can have dierent prices in a competitive equilibrium.
13That is, rms could have dierent marginal rates of substitution between transfers associated to dierent trades.
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utility function is
푢 푓 (Ξ, 푡) = 푢̂ 푓 (Ξ, 푡˜ ) ,
where
푡˜휔 =

푡휔 − Λ휔 (푡휔 ) if 푡휔 ≥ 0
푡휔 if 푡휔 < 0
.
The case of Λ휔 ( |푝휔 |) = 휆 |푝휔 | recovers the proportional transaction tax discussed above. When marginal tax rates are
strictly less than one14 and 푢̂ 푓 is continuous and satises the requisite monotonicity properties, 푢 푓 is continuous and
satises the requisite monotonicity properties as well. It is straightforward to extend the denition of 푡˜ to capture
transaction taxes that depend on the directions of transfers.
3.2 Bargaining costs and incomplete financial markets
There are at least two more interesting distortionary frictions that can sometimes be modeled as transaction taxes.
First, surplus might be lost during negotiation. In a reduced form, bargaining costs can be modeled as transaction
taxes [Galichon et al., 2018], and hence t neatly into the framework described in Section 3.1.
Second, nancial markets might be imperfect or otherwise incomplete. For example, suppose that rms pay for
goods in trade credit, which is paid o in cash after goods are exchanged. In the absence of risk aversion, uninsurable
idiosyncratic default risk can also be modeled as a transaction tax.15 Formally, the possibility that rm 푓 defaults with
(subjective) probability 휌 can be modeled as losing 휌 proportion of any payment made by 푓 . Our model can still capture
uninsurable idiosyncratic default risk in the presence of risk aversion, but not using the transaction tax framework.
More generally, our model can capture settings in which rms disagree about the relative values of dierent forms of
transfer due to the incompleteness of the nancial market.16
3.3 Leading examples
We now illustrate how distortionary frictions can aect competitive equilibria. We focus on proportional transaction
taxes (with 휆 = 10%) for the sake of simplicity, but in light of the discussion of Section 3.2, we could instead incorporate
bargaining costs or incomplete markets.
The rst example considers a cyclic economy in which rms have quasilinear preferences and transaction taxes are
incorporated using the framework described in Section 3.1. We show that equilibria can be Pareto-comparable.
Example 1 (Cyclic economy). There is a proportional transaction tax on all transfers of 휆 = 10%. As depicted in
Figure 2(a), there are two rms, 푓1 and 푓2, which interact via two trades. The rms share the same utility function
푢 푓푖 (Ξ, 푡) = 푣 (Ξ) +
∑
휔 ∈Ω푓푖
푡˜휔 ,
14Formally, we require that Λ휔 is continuous, Λ휔 (0) = 0, and 푥2 − Λ휔 (푥2) < 푥1 − Λ휔 (푥1) for all 푥1 > 푥2 > 0.
15As Jagadeesan [2017] points out, our model cannot capture settings with imperfectly-insurable default risk in which rms partially nance purchases
with trade credit and partially pay in cash.
16For example, rms might prefer one type of transfer over another if trades are priced in dierent currencies. The presence of multiple currencies with
common exchange rates does not distort markets per se. On the other hand, uninsurable risk or transaction costs associated with currency conversion can
be modeled as variable transaction costs.
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푓1
휁

푓2
휓
UU
(a) Trades in Examples 1 and 3.
푓1
휁

휁 ′

푓2
휓
UU
푓3
(b) Trades in Example 2.
Fig. 2. Trades in Examples 1, 2, and 3. Arrows point from sellers to buyers.
where the valuation 푣 is dened by
푣 (∅) = 0
푣 ({휁 ,휓 }) = 10
푣 ({휁 }) = 푣 ({휓 }) = −∞.
There are two sets of trades that can be supported in competitive equilibria: ∅ and {휁 ,휓 }. For example, the
arrangement [{휁 ,휓 };푝] is a competitive equilibrium if −100 ≤ 푝휁 = 푝휓 ≤ 100, and the arrangement [∅;푝] is a
competitive equilibrium if 푝휁 = 푝휓 ≥ 100 or 푝휁 = 푝휓 ≤ −100.17
Note that there are Pareto-comparable competitive equilibria: both 푓1 and 푓2 strictly prefer [{휁 ,휓 }; (0, 0)] over
any other competitive equilibrium with 푝휁 = 푝휓 . As pointed out by Hart [1975], the existence of Pareto-comparable
equilibria suggests that equilibria are constrained suboptimal.The competitive equilibria of the form [{휁 ,휓 };푝] and
[∅;푝] with 푝휁 = 푝휓 ≠ 0 are constrained Pareto-inecient.
In contrast, by the First Welfare Theorem, competitive equilibria cannot be Pareto-comparable in economies without
transaction taxes (see Supplementary Appendix F).
The second example shows that adding an outside option for 푓1 to Example 1 can shut down trade between 푓1 and 푓2.
The fact that enlarging the market can harm all rms suggests that equilibria are constrained suboptimal in the enlarged
market [Hart, 1975]. The constrained suboptimality is due to pecuniary externalities. In the context of Examples 1
and 2, adding an outside option can cause prices to become extreme, inducing heavy trading losses (due to taxes) that
shut down the market. In contrast, in economies without transaction taxes, adding an outside option can only aect
which other trades are realized if the outside option is used in equilibrium (see Supplementary Appendix F).
Example 2 (Cyclic economy with an outside trade). As depicted in Figure 2(b), there are three rms, 푓1, 푓2, and 푓3, which
interact via three trades. The rms’ utility functions are
푢 푓푖 (Ξ, 푡) = 푣 푓푖 (Ξ) +
∑
휔 ∈Ω푓푖
푡˜휔 ,
17In general, [ {휁 ,휓 };푝 ] is a competitive equilibrium if and only if
min{푝휁 , 0.9푝휁 } +min{−푝휓 ,−0.9푝휓 } ≥ −10 and min{−푝휁 ,−0.9푝휁 } +min{푝휓 , 0.9푝휓 } ≥ −10.
Similarly, [∅;푝 ] is a competitive equilibrium if and only if
min{푝휁 , 0.9푝휁 } +min{−푝휓 ,−0.9푝휓 } ≤ −10 and min{−푝휁 ,−0.9푝휁 } +min{푝휓 , 0.9푝휓 } ≤ −10.
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where 푣 푓푖 is the valuation of rm 푓푖 . We let 푣 푓푖 (∅) = 0 for all rms. Extending Example 1, rm 푓1’s valuation is dened
by
푣 푓1 ({휁 ,휓 }) = 푣 푓1 ({휁 ′,휓 }) = 10
푣 푓1 ({휁 }) = 푣 푓1 ({휁 ′}) = 푣 푓1 ({휓 }) = −∞
푣 푓1 ({휁 , 휁 ′}) = 푣 푓1 ({휁 , 휁 ′,휓 }) = −∞.
As in Example 1, rm 푓2’s valuation is dened by
푣 푓2 ({휁 ,휓 }) = 10
푣 푓2 ({휁 }) = 푣 푓2 ({휓 }) = −∞.
Firm 푓3’s valuation is dened by 푣 푓3 ({휁 ′}) = 300.
Trade 휁 ′ cannot be realized in equilibrium due to the technological constraints of 푓1 and 푓2 . Thus, we must have
푝휁 ′ ≥ 300 in any competitive equilibrium, as 푓3 must weakly prefer ∅ over {휁 ′} in equilibrium. For trade to occur, 푓1
must prefer 휁 over 휁 ′, and so we must have 푝휁 ≥ 300. With 10% taxation and 푝휁 ≥ 300, at least $30 in taxes must be
paid if 휁 is traded. But $30 exceeds the gains from trade between 푓1 and 푓2, and so trade cannot occur in any competitive
equilibrium. An example of a competitive equilibrium is [∅;푝] , where 푝휁 = 푝휓 = 푝휁 ′ = 350. Thus, introducing an
outside option that is not used can shut down a market when there are distortionary transaction taxes.18
4 EXISTENCE OF COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIA
Due to the presence of indivisibilities, competitive equilibria need not exist in our model without further assumptions
on preferences. Our key condition is full substitutability [Hateld et al., 2013].19 Intuitively, full substitutability requires
that every rm views its upstream trades as gross substitutes for each other, its downstream trades as gross substitutes
for each other, and its upstream and downstream trades as gross complements for one another.20
Assumption 1 (Full substitutability—FS, Hateld et al., 2013). For all 푓 ∈ 퐹 and all nite sets of contracts 푌,푌 ′ ⊆ 푋푓
with 푌푓→ ⊆ 푌 ′푓→ and 푌→푓 ⊇ 푌 ′→푓 , we have
푍 ′ ∩ 푌푓→ ⊆ 푍 and 푍 ∩ 푌 ′→푓 ⊆ 푍 ′
if 퐶 푓 (푌 ) = {푍 } and 퐶 푓 (푌 ′) = {푍 ′}.
Full substitutability requires that an expansion in the set of upstream (resp. downstream) options and a contraction
in the set of downstream (resp. upstream) options only makes upstream (resp. downstream) contracts less attractive and
downstream (resp. upstream) contracts more attractive for the rm. Technically, we impose this condition only on sets
of contracts from which the rm’s utility-maximizing choice is unique. In Appendix B, we show that full substitutability
is equivalent to a substitutability property that deals with indierences more explicitly.21
18However, rms 푓1 and 푓2 trade 휁 and휓 in every core outcome, and the core is non-empty. Indeed, the outside option does not disrupt trade in the core
because 푓1 and 푓3 cannot form a core block without breaking o all trade with 푓2 .
19Full substitutability generalizes gross substitutability [Gul and Stacchetti, 1999, Kelso and Crawford, 1982]. We use the choice-language full substitutability
condition introduced by Hateld et al. [2013], which extends the same-side substitutability and cross-side complementarity conditions of Ostrovsky
[2008] to choice correspondences.
20Section IIB in Hateld et al. [2013] provides a detailed discussion of the full substitutability condition in the context of trading networks with transferable
utility. For example, full substitutability rules out complementarities between inputs.
21Several of our proofs use the equivalence between our two denitions of full substitutability.
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Hateld et al. [2013] also need to assume that rms’ valuations of sets of trades are never +∞ to ensure that
competitive equilibria exist. We impose a similar condition that is adapted to settings in which utility is not perfectly
transferable. Our condition requires that compensating variations of moving from autarky to trade are bounded
below—i.e., that no set of trades is so desirable that it is preferred to autarky at any level of total transfers. This condition
is satised in transferable utility economies when valuations are bounded above.
Assumption 2 (Bounded compensating variations—BCV). For all 푓 ∈ 퐹, we have
inf
푢 푓 (Ξ,푡 ) ≥0
∑
휔 ∈Ω푓
푡휔 > −∞.
BCV requires that net transfers
∑
휔 ∈Ω푓 푡휔 are bounded below over all transfer vectors 푡 that are acceptable alongside
some set of trades Ξ. If a rm is willing to accept trades alongside arbitrary negative net transfers, then BCV fails. BCV
is a weak assumption that is likely to be satised in any real-world economy. In particular, BCV is satised in Examples 1
and 2. Note that BCV allows for technological constraints, in that it permits sets of trades to be so undesirable to a rm
that they remain worse than autarky regardless of how much the rm receives in transfers.
FS and BCV together ensure that competitive equilibria exist in trading networks. In Supplementary Appendix F, we
show by example that competitive equilibria may not exist if BCV is not satised.
Theorem 1. Under FS and BCV, competitive equilibria exist.
To prove Theorem 1, we construct a modied economy by giving every rm options to execute all trades at a very
undesirable price. Specically, we give every rm the option to make any trade by paying a cost of
Π > −
∑
푓 ∈퐹
inf
푢 푓 (Ξ,푡 ) ≥0
∑
휔 ∈Ω푓
푡휔 . (1)
The penalty Π can be chosen to be nite due to BCV. Hence, rms have bounded willingness to pay for any contract in
the modied economy, in a sense that we make precise in Section 5.2.22 We discretize prices and use a generalized
Deferred Acceptance algorithm [Fleiner et al., 2018b, Hateld and Kominers, 2012, Ostrovsky, 2008] to show the
existence of approximate equilibria in the modied economy. A limiting argument yields the existence of competitive
equilibria in the modied economy, as in Crawford and Knoer [1981] and Kelso and Crawford [1982]. The fact that Π is
suciently large (i.e., (1) is satised) ensures that we actually obtain competitive equilibria in the original economy.23
5 RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIA
AND COOPERATIVE SOLUTION CONCEPTS
We now study the relationships between competitive equilibria and cooperative solution concepts from matching
theory. Instead of assuming that rms are price-takers, we allow rms to recontract while keeping or dropping existing
contracts. We focus on two solution concepts: trail stability and stability.
A key ingredient of any reasonable stability property is individual rationality, which requires that no rm wants to
drop any signed contract.
22Hateld et al. [2013] apply a related, but not exactly analogous, transformation in the proof of their existence result (Theorem 1 in Hateld et al. [2013]).
Specically, Hateld et al. [2013] give rms both the option to make a trade by paying a cost of Π and the option to dispose of an undesired trade for a cost
of Π (for a suciently large Π). The Hateld et al. [2013] approach does not in general preserve full substitutability at the level of generality of our model.
23Theorem 1 generalizes Theorem 2 in Kelso and Crawford [1982] and Theorem 1 in Hateld et al. [2013].
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Denition 2 (Hateld et al., 2013, Roth, 1984). An outcome 퐴 ⊆ 푋 is individually rational if 퐴푓 ∈ 퐶 푓 (퐴푓 ) for all
푓 ∈ 퐹 .
5.1 Trail stability
Trail stability [Fleiner et al., 2018b] is a natural extension of pairwise stability (in the sense of Gale and Shapley [1962])
to trading networks. A trail is a sequence of contracts such that a buyer in one contract is a seller in the next contract.
A trail may involve a rm more than once and can begin and end with contracts that involve the same rm.
Denition 3. A sequence of contracts (푥1, . . . , 푥푛) is a trail if b(푥푖 ) = s(푥푖+1) for all 1 ≤ 푖 ≤ 푛 − 1.
Trail-stable outcomes are immune to sequential deviations called locally blocking trails. A locally blocking trail
begins with a rm oering a sale that it wishes to sign given its existing contracts, possibly while dropping some
existing contracts. The buyer may accept the oered contract while dropping some of his existing contracts, in which
case a locally blocking trail is formed. The buyer may also hold the proposal and oer an additional sale to the original
proposer or to another rm. This trail of linked oers continues until a rm accepts an oered contract without having
to oer another sale, in which case a locally blocking trail is formed.24
Our formal denition of trail stability extends the denition given by Fleiner et al. [2018b] to settings with indier-
ences.
Denition 4. A trail (푧1, . . . , 푧푛) locally blocks an outcome 퐴 if:
• 퐴푓1 ∉ 퐶 푓1 (퐴푓1 ∪ {푧1}), where 푓1 = s(푧1);
• 퐴푓푖+1 ∉ 퐶 푓푖+1 (퐴푓푖+1 ∪ {푧푖 , 푧푖+1}) for 1 ≤ 푖 ≤ 푛 − 1, where 푓푖+1 = b(푧푖 ) = s(푧푖+1); and
• 퐴푓푛+1 ∉ 퐶 푓푛+1 (퐴푓푛+1 ∪ {푧푛}), where 푓푛+1 = b(푧푛).
Such a trail is called a locally blocking trail. An outcome is trail-stable if it is individually rational and there is no locally
blocking trail.
A trail locally blocks an individually rational outcome if, at every point at which a trail passes through a rm, the
rm would like some of the contracts that are available to it locally in the trail (when given access to the existing
contracts). Intuitively, one should think of contracts in a locally blocking trail as being proposed by telephone by a
manager at one rm to a manager at another [Fleiner et al., 2018b]. If the sequence of phone conversations returns
to a rm, a dierent manager (e.g., one from another division) picks up the phone and considers the latest oer. Her
decisions are independent of the oers received and made by the rst manager. Any manager’s unilateral decision to
accept an oered contract completes a locally blocking trail.
5.2 A cooperative interpretation of competitive equilibria
The main result of this section provides a cooperative interpretation of competitive equilibrium that holds even in the
presence of frictions.
Theorem 2. Every competitive equilibrium outcome is trail-stable.
Theorem 2 implies that price-taking rms cannot improve upon a market equilibrium by deviating along trails. In
light of Theorem 2, any prediction of our model that holds in every trail-stable outcome must hold in every competitive
equilibrium outcome.
24Note that locally blocking trails can also develop in the reverse direction, with rms oering to buy instead of to sell.
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To see the intuition behind Theorem 2, consider any competitive equilibrium and any trail. In order for sellers to
want to propose the contracts in the trail, the prices of all trades in the trail must be greater than their equilibrium prices.
But the last buyer will only accept an oer if the price in the last contract is lower than the equilibrium price of the
corresponding trade. Hence, there cannot be any locally blocking trails. Theorem 2 does not require any assumptions
beyond the monotonicity of utility in transfers. As we will show in Section 5.3, competitive equilibria do not satisfy
stronger cooperative solution concepts in the presence of frictions.
In light of Theorem 2, the conclusions of Examples 1 and 2 hold for trail-stable outcomes as well. Thus, trail-stable
outcomes can suer from constrained suboptimality due to pecuniary externalities despite being dened cooperatively.25
Theorems 1 and 2 yield sucient conditions for the existence of trail-stable outcomes.26
Corollary 1. Under FS and BCV, trail-stable outcomes exist.
5.3 Stability
Groups of rms might still be able to commit to recontracting at a trail-stable outcome. Stability rules out such
recontracting opportunities, which are called blocks, and may be a more natural solution concept in settings in which
rms can coordinate easily.27 Hateld et al. [2013] extend the denition of stability to settings with indierences.
Denition 5 (Hateld et al., 2013). A non-empty set of contracts 푍 ⊆ 푋 r 퐴 blocks 퐴 if, for all 푓 ∈ 퐹 and 푌 ∈
퐶 푓 (퐴푓 ∪ 푍 푓 ), we have 푍 푓 ⊆ 푌 . An outcome is stable if it is individually rational and unblocked.
In a stable outcome, no group of rms can commit to recontracting among themselves while being free to drop any
contracts. Unfortunately, competitive equilibria may be unstable in the presence of frictions; moreover, stable outcomes
need not even exist.28 Hence, as Fleiner et al. [2018b] argue, stability may be too stringent of a solution concept in
general networks.
Example 2 continued (Stable outcomes need not exist in the presence of frictions). There are no stable outcomes in
Example 2. Indeed, note that the no-trade outcome is unstable, since it is blocked by trade between 푓1 and 푓2. Note also
that 푓1 and 푓3 cannot trade in any individually rational outcome due to the technological constraints faced by 푓1 and 푓2.
On the other hand, any individually rational outcome that involves trade between 푓1 and 푓2 is blocked by trade
between 푓1 and 푓3. Indeed, note that 휁 cannot be traded at any price greater than $200 in an individually rational
outcome, since the social surplus of trade between 푓1 and 푓2 is only $20 and making a transfer of at least $200 requires
paying a transaction tax of at least $20. But the contract (휁 ′, 250) blocks any outcome in which 휁 is traded at price
below $250.29
As noted by Hateld and Kominers [2012], requiring that the trading network is acyclic—i.e., that it forms a vertical
supply chain—helps restore the existence of stable outcomes in settings with discrete, bounded prices. Appendix A
25As shown by Blair [1988] and Klaus and Walzl [2009], (pairwise) stable outcomes can suer from constrained suboptimality even in two-sided
many-to-many matching markets.
26Corollary 1 is a version of Theorem 1 in Fleiner et al. [2018b]—which generalizes Theorem 1 in Ostrovsky [2008] from supply chains to general
networks—for settings with prices that are continuous and potentially unbounded.
27See Roth [1984, 1985], Hateld and Milgrom [2005], Echenique and Oviedo [2006], and Hateld and Kominers [2012, 2017].
28Determining whether a stable outcome exists and determining whether a particular outcome is stable are both computationally intractable problems in
trading networks with cycles and discrete contracts [Fleiner, Jankó, Schlotter, and Teytelboym, 2018a]. Trail stability is more natural from a computational
perspective—trail-stable outcomes can be found in polynomial time using the generalized Deferred Acceptance algorithm under full substitutability
[Fleiner et al., 2018b].
29An alternative proof can be given using one of our lifting results (Theorem 3). Indeed, note that the no-trade outcome is not stable. However, any stable
outcome must lift to a competitive equilibrium by Theorem 3, and trade does not occur in any competitive equilibrium.
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shows that similar logic carries over to our setting, which features unbounded, continuous prices. The underlying
reason is that stability and trail stability coincide in acyclic networks, at least under FS, as we show in Appendix A.
Even in trading networks with cycles, under FS, stability actually renes trail stability.30
Proposition 1. Under FS, every stable outcome is trail-stable.
If FS is not satised, then stable outcomes may not be trail-stable (see Supplementary Appendix F).
5.4 Competitive interpretations of trail stability and
stability
We now develop competitive interpretations of trail stability and stability. Formally, we say that an outcome 퐴 lifts
to a competitive equilibrium if 퐴 is a competitive equilibrium outcome—that is, if 퐴 can be supported by competitive
equilibrium prices. As an outcome species prices for realized trades, the non-trivial part of lifting an outcome to a
competitive equilibrium is nding equilibrium prices for unrealized trades.
Hateld et al. [2013] show by example that stable outcomes do not generally lift to competitive equilibria when FS is
not satised. Therefore, we maintain FS throughout this section. We rst prove a positive result, namely that stable
outcomes lift to competitive equilibria under the conditions for the existence of competitive equilibria.31
Theorem 3. Under FS and BCV, stable outcomes lift to competitive equilibria.
Frictions can cause stable outcomes to fail to exist in general networks as Example 2 shows. Therefore, for many
trading networks with frictions, Theorem 3 has no bite. On the other hand, trail-stable outcomes need not lift to
competitive equilibria even under FS and BCV, as the following example shows.
Example 3 (Trail-stable outcomes need not lift to competitive equilibria under FS and BCV). As depicted in Figure 2(a),
there are two rms, 푓1 and 푓2, which interact via two trades. The rms share the same utility function
푢 푓푖 (Ξ, 푡) = 푣 (Ξ) +
∑
휔 ∈Ω
푡휔 ,
where 푣 is as in Example 1. The no-trade outcome is trail-stable but inecient. However, as utility is transferable,
all competitive equilibrium outcomes are ecient. In particular, the no-trade outcome cannot lift to a competitive
equilibrium.
In Example 3, both rms face hard technological constraints: they are unwilling to execute any trade individually at
any nite price, but would like to complete both trades together. The no-trade outcome is trail-stable because neither
the buyer nor the seller is willing to oer to buy or sell a single trade at any nite price.
To ensure that trail-stable outcomes lift to a competitive equilibrium, we impose a dierent regularity condition than
BCV. Intuitively, we require that rms have bounded willingness to pay for any trade.
Assumption 3 (Bounded willingness to pay—BWP). There exists 푀 such that for all rms 푓 ∈ 퐹 and all nite sets of
contracts 푌, 푍 ⊆ 푋푓 with 푍 ∈ 퐶 푓 (푌 ):
• If (휔, 푝휔 ) ∈ 푍→푓 , then 푝휔 < 푀 .
30Proposition 1 is a version of Lemma 5 in Fleiner et al. [2018b] for settings with prices that are continuous and potentially unbounded.
31Theorem 3 generalizes Theorem 6 in Hateld et al. [2013] to trading networks with distortionary frictions and income eects. Stable outcomes exist in
acyclic networks even in the presence of frictions, as we show in Appendix A.
Tamás Fleiner, Ravi Jagadeesan, Zsuzsanna Jankó, and Alexander Teytelboym 14
• If (휔, 푝휔 ) ∈ 푍 푓→, then 푝휔 > −푀 .
BWP requires that no rm is willing to pay more than 푀 for any trade—i.e., no rm is willing to buy any trade at a
price more than 푀 or sell any trade at a price less than −푀 . BWP rules out certain technological constraints, including
those that are permitted under BCV and by Hateld et al. [2013]. In particular, BWP does not allow a rm to require
a particular input in order to produce a particular output, as such constraints make a rm willing to pay arbitrarily
high prices for the input if the rm is able to procure arbitrarily high prices for the output. However, BWP allows for
capacity constraints, since they never make trades desirable at extremely unfavorable prices.
BWP helps ensure that trail-stable outcome lift to competitive equilibria.32
Theorem 4. Under FS and BWP, trail-stable outcomes lift to competitive equilibria.
Theorem 4 provides a competitive interpretation of trail stability: any trail-stable outcome is consistent with price-
taking equilibrium behavior by all rms (at least under FS and BWP). In light of Theorem 4, any prediction of our model
that holds in every competitive equilibrium must hold in every trail-stable outcome.
Theorems 2 and 4 imply that competitive equilibria are essentially equivalent to trail-stable outcomes in our model.33
Corollary 2. Under FS and BWP, competitive equilibrium outcomes and trail-stable outcomes exist and coincide.
Corollary 2 provides competitive foundations for trail stability and cooperative foundations for competitive equilib-
rium: the assumption that rms coordinate on a trail-stable outcome (as in a thin market) produces the same predictions
as the assumption that rms take prices in equilibrium (as in a thick market). Therefore, equilibrium analysis can be
performed using scale-independent solution concepts, even in markets with frictions.
6 COMPLETE MARKETS
Trail-stable and competitive equilibrium outcomes might be constrained Pareto-inecient in the presence of proportional
transaction taxes or other distortionary frictions (see Examples 1 and 2). In the presence of transaction taxes, for
example, all rms nd reductions in outgoing payments more desirable than equal increases in incoming payments. As
a result, rms have dierent marginal rates of substitution between forms of transfer, unlike in settings with complete
nancial markets.
Since we do not explicitly model nancial markets, we formalize “equalization of marginal rates of substitution
between forms of transfer" as “indierence between all forms of transfer" in dening our market completeness condition.
Intuitively, if the rms share the same marginal rates of substitution between forms of transfer, then transfers can be
redenominated so that the marginal rates of substitution become 1. The possibility of redenomination is precisely why,
for example, the presence of multiple currencies does not cause market incompleteness per se.
Assumption 4 (Complete markets—CM). For all 푓 ∈ 퐹 and 푡, 푡 ′ ∈ RΩ푓 with ∑휔 ∈Ω푓 푡휔 = ∑휔 ∈Ω푓 푡 ′휔 , we have
푢 푓 (Ξ, 푡) = 푢 푓 (Ξ, 푡 ′) for all Ξ ⊆ Ω푓 .
Recall that, in Examples 1 and 2, paying one unit is more costly for rms than receiving one unit (due to transaction
taxes). Assumption CM rules out these dierences in the costs of transfers and requires that rms only care about the
32Despite the fact that BWP is not satised in Examples 1 and 2, trail-stable outcomes lift to competitive equilibria in both examples. Thus, BWP is
sucient but not necessary for trail-stable outcomes to lift to competitive equilibria.
33To derive Corollary 2 formally, we need to establish that competitive equilibria exist under FS and BWP, as Theorem D.1 in the Supplementary Appendix
shows.
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total transfers that they receive or pay. Therefore, CM requires that a unit of transfer for one trade be equivalent to a
unit of transfer for any other trade.34 Under CM, we can write 푢 푓 (Ξ, 푡) = 푢 푓 (Ξ, 푞), where 푞 = ∑휔 ∈Ω 푡휔 is the total or
net transfer. Note that while CM rules out distortionary frictions—such as variable sales taxes, bargaining costs, and
incompleteness in nancial markets—xed transaction costs and income eects are still permitted under CM.35
We begin our analysis of trading networks with complete markets by recalling the denition of strong group stability,
which is the most stringent stability property from the literature on matching with contracts. A strongly group stable
outcome is immune to blocks by coalitions of rms that can commit to better, new contracts and maintain any existing
contracts with each other and with rms outside the blocking coalition.
Denition 6 (Hateld et al., 2013). An outcome퐴 is strongly unblocked if there do not exist a non-empty set 푍 ⊆ 푋 r퐴
and sets of contracts 푌 푓 ⊆ 퐴푓 ∪ 푍 푓 for 푓 ∈ 퐹 such that 푌 푓 ⊇ 푍 푓 and푈 푓
(
푌 푓
)
> 푈 푓
(
퐴푓
)
for all 푓 ∈ 퐹 with 푍 푓 ≠ ∅.
An outcome is strongly group stable if it is individually rational and strongly unblocked.
In Denition 6, 푌 푓 is the set of contracts that 푓 signs in the block. Note that 푌 푓 need not be 푓 ’s best choice from
the set of available contracts. In particular, strong group stability rules out blocks in which rms only improve their
utility by selecting all of the blocking contracts. Hence, as Hateld et al. [2013] show, strong group stability is stronger
than stability. Moreover, 푌 푓 can contain existing contracts that the counterparties no longer want. In particular, strong
group stability rules out blocks in which dierent members of the blocking coalition can make selections from the set
of existing contracts that are incompatible with one another or involve rms outside the coalition. Hence, strong group
stability also renes properties such as (strong) setwise stability [Echenique and Oviedo, 2006, Klaus and Walzl, 2009]
and the core.36
It appears extremely unlikely that rms would rationally deviate from a strongly group stable outcome, and
competitive equilibria are strongly group stable in complete markets.37
Theorem 5 (First Welfare Theorem). Under CM, competitive equilibrium outcomes are strongly group stable.
Since strongly group stable outcomes are stable and in the core, Theorem 5 implies that competitive equilibrium
outcomes are stable and in the core in complete markets. As core outcomes are Pareto-ecient, Theorem 5 is a version
of the First Welfare Theorem [Debreu, 1951].
Combining Theorem 5 with our results on markets with frictions, we obtain that all of the solution concepts described
in this paper are essentially equivalent in complete markets (under FS and BWP).
Corollary 3. Under FS, BWP, and CM, competitive equilibrium outcomes, strongly group stable outcomes, stable outcomes,
and trail-stable outcomes exist and coincide.
When markets are complete, we can also restate BCV more simply using only total transfers, since rms are indierent
regarding the sources of transfers.
34In particular, any transferable utility economy satises CM.
35When assumed jointly, FS and CM restrict income eects for certain agents. In particular, intermediaries that buy or sell more than one trade cannot
experience income eects. However, rms that act only as buyers or only as sellers can experience limited income eects. Moreover, rms that buy or sell
only one trade at a time can experience arbitrary income eects. In incomplete markets, on the other hand, all rms can experience income eects even
under FS.
36As pointed out by Hateld et al. [2013], strong group stability also renes strong stability [Hateld and Kominers, 2015], and group stability [Konishi
and Ünver, 2006].
37Theorem 5 extends Theorem 5 in Hateld et al. [2013], which shows that competitive equilibrium outcomes are strongly group stable, to settings with
income eects or risk aversion.
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Assumption 2′ (Bounded CVs under CM—BCV-CM). For all 푓 ∈ 퐹, we have
inf
푢 푓 (Ξ,푞) ≥푢 푓 (∅,0)
푞 > −∞.
In complete markets, under FS and BCV-CM, we obtain an equivalence between competitive equilibrium and (strong
group) stability.38
Corollary 4. Under FS, BCV-CM, and CM, competitive equilibrium outcomes, strongly group stable outcomes, and stable
outcomes exist and coincide.39
7 CONCLUSION
This paper develops a model of dierentiated markets with frictions based on matching in trading networks. Competitive
equilibria exist in our model when trades are fully substitutable (and mild regularity conditions are satised) but may
be inecient. In the presence of frictions, competitive equilibria may be unstable but still essentially coincide with
trail-stable outcomes. In complete markets, on the other hand, competitive equilibria are essentially equivalent to
stable outcomes and trail-stable outcomes, even in the presence of income eects. Our results provide new cooperative
foundations for competitive equilibrium and competitive foundations for trail stability that apply in thin markets and
in markets with frictions.
We leave three theoretical open questions. First, can the complete markets condition be relaxed while still guarantee-
ing that competitive equilibrium outcomes are stable? Second, to what extent can the condition that rms have bounded
willingness to pay for trades be relaxed while still ensuring that trail-stable outcomes lift to competitive equilibria?
Third, can externalities or peer eects (as analyzed by Pycia [2012], Pycia and Yenmez [2017], and Rostek and Yoder
[2017]) be incorporated into our analysis?
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Appendix
A ACYCLIC NETWORKS
In acyclic trading networks, or supply chains, no rm can be simultaneously upstream and downstream from another
rm even via intermediaries [Hateld and Kominers, 2012, Ostrovsky, 2008, Westkamp, 2010].
Assumption A.1 (Acyclicity—AC). There do not exist 푛 ≥ 1 and trades 휔1, . . . , 휔푛 such that s(휔푖+1) = b(휔푖 ) for all
1 ≤ 푖 ≤ 푛, where 휔푛+1 = 휔1 .
As shown by Ostrovsky [2008] and Hateld and Kominers [2012], imposing acyclicity can help ensure the existence
of stable outcomes in trading networks with frictions. In acyclic networks, trail stability is tautologically equivalent to
chain stability (in the sense of Ostrovsky [2008]). The following lemma relates stability and trail stability in acyclic
networks.
Lemma A.1. Under FS and AC, every trail-stable outcome is stable.
Proposition 1 and Lemma A.1 imply that trail-stable and stable outcomes coincide in supply chains under FS, yielding
a continuous-price version of Theorem 7 in Hateld and Kominers [2012].
We now derive several results concerning acyclic networks as corollaries of our results on general trading networks
with frictions. First, competitive equilibria are stable under FS and AC (by Theorem 2 and Lemma A.1).
Corollary A.1. Under FS and AC, every competitive equilibrium outcome is stable.
Theorem 1 and Corollary A.1 imply that FS, BCV, and AC are together sucient for the existence of stable outcomes.40
Corollary A.2. Under FS, BCV, and AC, stable outcomes exist.
In light of Lemma A.1, trail-stable outcomes must lift to competitive equilibria in supply chains under FS and BCV
by Theorem 3. Hence, imposing acyclicity allows us to replace BWP with BCV in Theorem 4.
Corollary A.3. Under FS, BCV, and AC, trail-stable outcomes lift to competitive equilibria.
B AN EQUIVALENT DEFINITION OF FULL SUBSTITUTABILITY
This appendix states a version of Theorem A.1 in Hateld et al. [2019]. More precisely, we show that full substitutability
implies strong full substitutability, a condition that deals with indierences more directly.
Strong full substitutability combines four conditions, which are each similar to conditions dened in Appendix
A in Hateld et al. [2019]. The rst condition, increasing-price full substitutability for sales, requires that sales are
substitutable to each other and complementary to purchases as prices rise (i.e., as the set of available purchases shrinks
and the set of available sales expands). The analogous condition for purchases is decreasing-price full substitutability for
purchases. We also consider similar two other conditions, decreasing-price full substitutability for sales and increasing-
price full substitutability for purchases, which are not exactly analogous to the rst two conditions due to income eects.
Assumption 1′ (Strong FS—SFS). For all 푓 ∈ 퐹, nite 푌,푌 ′ ⊆ 푋푓 , and 푍 ∈ 퐶 푓 (푌 ):
40Corollary A.2 is a version of Theorem 1 in Ostrovsky [2008] and Theorem 3 in Hateld and Kominers [2012] for settings in which prices are continuous.
However, Corollary A.2 holds even when willingness to pay is unbounded (i.e., BWP is not satised), unlike the existence results proved by Ostrovsky
[2008] and Hateld and Kominers [2012].
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• (Increasing-price full substitutability for sales—IFSS) If 푌→푓 ⊇ 푌 ′→푓 and 푌푓→ ⊆ 푌 ′푓→, then there exists
푍 ′ ∈ 퐶 푓 (푌 ′) with 푍 ′ ∩ 푌푓→ ⊆ 푍 .
• (Decreasing-price full substitutability for purchases—DFSP) If 푌푓→ ⊇ 푌 ′푓→ and 푌→푓 ⊆ 푌 ′→푓 , then there exists
푍 ′ ∈ 퐶 푓 (푌 ′) with 푍 ′ ∩ 푌→푓 ⊆ 푍 .
For all 푓 ∈ 퐹, nite 푌,푌 ′ ⊆ 푋푓 , and 푦 ∈ 푌 such that there exists 푍 ∈ 퐶 푓 (푌 ) with 푦 ∈ 푍 :
• (Decreasing-price full substitutability for sales—DFSS) If 푌→푓 ⊆ 푌 ′→푓 and 푌푓→ ⊇ 푌 ′푓→ 3 푦, then there exists
푍 ′ ∈ 퐶 푓 (푌 ′) with 푦 ∈ 푍 ′.
• (Increasing-price full substitutability for purchases—IFSP) If 푌푓→ ⊆ 푌 ′푓→ and 푌→푓 ⊇ 푌 ′→푓 3 푦, then there
exists 푍 ′ ∈ 퐶 푓 (푌 ′) with 푦 ∈ 푍 ′.
The main theorem of this section asserts that FS and SFS are equivalent.
Theorem B.1. FS is equivalent to SFS.
We use Theorem B.1 to deal with indierences in the proofs of several of our results. Although Hateld et al. [2019]
rule out income eects, Theorem B.1 is logically independent of Theorem A.1 in Hateld et al. [2019] as we derive a
weaker conclusion.
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Supplementary appendix
C PROOF OF THEOREM ??
Fix a rm 푓 ∈ 퐹 . We rst translate the statement of Theorem B.1 to demand-language, taking care to account for the
possibility that a trade is not available at any nite price. We then apply a perturbation argument similar to the proof
of Theorem B.1 in Hateld et al. [2019] to prove a demand language version of Theorem B.1, which is equivalent to
Theorem B.1. We note that the notation and the lemma (Lemma C.1) discussed in this section are also used in the proof
of Theorem 1.
C.1 Passing to demand language
We use innite prices to denote unavailable trades for the sake of notational convenience. Formally, dene a set of
prices by
P = (R ∪ {−∞})Ω푓→ × (R ∪ {∞})Ω→푓 ,
where R ∪ {−∞} and R ∪ {∞} are topologized with the disjoint union topologies. Given 푝 ∈ P and Ξ ⊆ Ω푓 , let
푈 푓 (Ξ|푝) = 푢 푓
(
Ξ,
(
푝Ξ푓→ , (−푝)Ξ→푓 , 0Ω푓rΞ
))
denote 푓 ’s utility of trading set Ξ of contracts at price vector 푝, where we write 푢 푓 (Ξ, 푡) = −∞ if 푡휔 = −∞ for some
휔 ∈ Ω푓 . Dene the extended demand correspondence D푓 : P⇒ P(Ω푓 ) by
D푓 (푝) = arg max
Ξ⊆Ω푓
푈 푓 (Ξ|푝) .
Note that the restriction of the extended demand correspondence to RΩ푓 is precisely the demand correspondence 퐷 푓 .
We write full substitutability in demand language similarly to Hateld et al. [2019].
Denition C.1 (Hateld et al., 2019). D푓 is (demand-language) fully substitutable if for all 푝 ≤ 푝 ′ ∈ P with |D푓 (푝) | =
|D푓 (푝 ′) | = 1, we have
Ξ′ ∩ {휔 ∈ Ω푓→ | 푝휔 = 푝 ′휔 } ⊆ Ξ
Ξ ∩ {휔 ∈ Ω→푓 | 푝휔 = 푝 ′휔 } ⊆ Ξ′,
where D푓 (푝) = {Ξ} and D푓 (푝 ′) = {Ξ′}.
We now write the constitutent conditions of strong full substitutability in demand language similarly to Hateld
et al. [2019].
Denition C.2. D푓 is (demand-language) increasing-price fully substitutable for sales if for all 푝 ≤ 푝 ′ ∈ P and
Ξ ∈ D푓 (푝), there exists Ξ′ ∈ D푓 (푝 ′) with
Ξ′ ∩ {휔 ∈ Ω푓→ | 푝휔 = 푝 ′휔 } ⊆ Ξ.
Denition C.3. D푓 is (demand-language) decreasing-price fully substitutable for sales if for all 푝 ≥ 푝 ′ ∈ P and
휓 ∈ Ξ ∈ D푓 (푝) with휓 ∈ Ω푓→ and 푝휓 = 푝 ′휓 , there exists Ξ′ ∈ D푓 (푝 ′) with휓 ∈ Ξ′.
The original substitutability conditions are equivalent to their demand-language analogues, as the following lemma
shows formally.
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LemmaC.1. 퐶 푓 is fully substitutable (resp. increasing-price fully substitutable for sales, decreasing-price fully substitutable
for sales) if and only if D푓 is.
Proof. Given a nite set of contracts 푌 ⊆ 푋, dene a price vector 푝 푓 (푌 ) ∈ RΩ푓 by
푝 푓 (푌 )휔 =

sup(휔,푞) ∈푌 푞 for 휔 ∈ Ω푓→
inf (휔,푞) ∈푌 푞 for 휔 ∈ Ω→푓
,
so that 푝 푓 (푌 )휔 is the most favorable price at which 휔 is available in 푌 . Due to the denitions of 퐶 푓 and D푓 , we have
퐶 푓 (푌 ) =
{{(
휔, 푝 푓 (푌 )휔
)
| 휔 ∈ Ψ
}
| Ψ ∈ D푓
(
푝 푓 (푌 )
)}
for all nite sets 푌 ⊆ 푋 . It follows that 퐶 푓 is fully substitutable (resp. increasing-price fully substitutable for sales,
decreasing-price fully substitutable for sales) whenever D푓 is. Note also that
D푓 (푝) =
{
휏 (푌 ) | 푌 ∈ 퐶 푓 ({(휔, 푝휔 ) | 푝휔 ∈ R})
}
for all 푝 ∈ P. It follows that D푓 is fully substitutable (resp. increasing-price fully substitutable for sales, decreasing-
price fully substitutable for sales) whenever 퐶 푓 is. 
Note that D푓 is upper hemi-continuous by Berge’s Maximum Theorem. Considering perturbations shows that
extended demand is generically single-valued on P.
Claim C.1. The set {푝 ∈ P | |D푓 (푝) | = 1} is open and dense in P.
Proof. Let 픖 = {푝 ∈ P | |D푓 (푝) | = 1}. The set 픖 is open because D푓 is upper hemi-continuous and P(Ω푓 ) is
discrete. To see that픖 is dense, note that for all Ξ ≠ Ξ′ ⊆ Ω, the set
{푝 ∈ P | 푈 푓 (Ξ|푝) = 푈 푓 (Ξ′ |푝 ) ≠ −∞}
is nowhere dense. Indeed, if푈 푓 (Ξ|푝) = 푈 푓 (Ξ′ |푝) ≠ −∞,we have푈 푓 (Ξ|푝 ′) ≠ 푈 푓 (Ξ′ |푝 ′) for any 푝 ′ =
(
푝Ωr{휔 }, 푝휔 + 휖
)
and 휔 ∈ (Ξr Ξ′) ∪ (Ξ′ r Ξ). 
C.2 Theorem B.1 in demand-language
The following technical result exploits the upper hemi-continuity of extended demand and uses perturbations to perform
certain selections from the extended demand correspondence.
Claim C.2. Let 푝 ∈ RΩ and let픙 ⊆ RΩ푓 be open and dense in some neighborhood of 0.
(a) For all Ψ ∈ D푓 (푝), there exists 휖 ∈ 픙 such that D푓 (푝 + 휖) = {Ψ′} ⊆ D푓 (푝) with Ψ′ ⊆ Ψ.
(b) If휓 ∈ Ψ ∈ D푓 (푝), then there exists 휖 ∈ 픙 such that D푓 (푝 + 휖) = {Ψ′} ⊆ D푓 (푝) with휓 ∈ Ψ′.
Proof. By shrinking픙 if necessary, we can assume thatD푓 (푝 +휖) ⊆ D푓 (푝) for all 휖 ∈ 픙 (by upper hemi-continuity).
We begin by proving Part (a). First, we show that there exists 휖 ∈ 픙 such that Ψ′ ⊆ Ψ for all Ψ′ ∈ D푓 (푝 + 휖). Take
휖 =
(
0Ψ, 훿Ω→푓rΨ,−훿Ω푓→rΨ
)
, where 훿 > 0 is such that 휖 ∈ 픙. Note that푈 푓 (Ξ|푝 + 휖) ≤ 푈 푓 (Ξ|푝) for all Ξ ⊆ Ω with
equality if and only if Ξ ⊆ Ψ. It follows that Ψ′ ⊆ Ψ for all Ψ′ ∈ D푓 (푝 + 휖).
To complete the proof of Part (a), we perturb 휖 . More precisely, let 픙′ be an open neighborhood of 0 ∈ RΩ푓 such
that D푓 (푝 + 휖 + 휖 ′) ⊆ D푓 (푝 + 휖) for all 휖 ′ ∈ 픙′—such a 픙′ exists by upper hemi-continuity. By Claim C.1, there exists
휖 ′ ∈ 픙′ such that 휖 + 휖 ′ ∈ 픙 and |D푓 (푝 + 휖 + 휖 ′) | = 1.
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The proof of Part (b) is similar. Note that 휓 is never demanded if |푝휓 | = ∞. Hence, we must have 푝휓 ∈ R. First,
we show that there exists 휖 ∈ 픙 such that 휓 ∈ Ψ′ for all Ψ′ ∈ D푓 (푝 + 휖). Without loss of generality, assume that
휓 ∈ Ω푓→. Take 휖 =
(
0Ω푓r{휓 }, 훿휓
)
, where 훿 > 0 is such that 휖 ∈ 픙. Note that푈 푓 (Ξ|푝 + 휖) ≥ 푈 푓 (Ξ|푝) for all Ξ ⊆ Ω
with equality if and only if휓 ∉ Ξ. It follows that휓 ∈ Ψ′ for all Ψ′ ∈ D푓 (푝 + 휖).
To complete the proof of Part (b), we perturb 휖 as in the proof of Part (a). 
Using suitable selections, Claim C.2 implies a demand-language version of Theorem B.1.
Claim C.3. If D푓 is fully substitutable, then D푓 is increasing-price fully substitutable for sales.
Proof. Let 푝 ≤ 푝 ′ ∈ P, and let Ξ ∈ D푓 (푝). Let
픙 =
{
휖 ∈ RΩ푓 | D푓 (푝 ′ + 휖) ⊆ D푓 (푝 ′) and |D푓 (푝 ′ + 휖) | = 1
}
,
which is non-empty and dense in a neighborhood of 0 by Claim C.1 and upper hemi-continuity. By Claim C.2(a), there
exists 휖 ∈ 픙 such that D푓 (푝 +휖) = {Ψ} with Ψ ⊆ Ξ. Note that D푓 (푝 ′ +휖) = {Ξ′} for some Ξ′ ∈ D푓 (푝 ′) by construction.
Because D푓 is fully substitutable, we have
Ξ′ ∩ {휔 ∈ Ω푓→ | 푝휔 = 푝 ′휔 } ⊆ Ψ ⊆ Ξ.
It follows that D푓 is increasing-price fully substitutable for sales. 
Claim C.4. If D푓 is fully substitutable, then D푓 is decreasing-price fully substitutable for sales.
Proof. Let 푝 ≥ 푝 ′ ∈ P, let Ξ ∈ D푓 (푝), and suppose that휓 ∈ Ξ satises 푝휓 = 푝 ′휓 . Let
픙 =
{
휖 ∈ RΩ푓 | D푓 (푝 ′ + 휖) ⊆ D푓 (푝 ′) and |D푓 (푝 ′ + 휖) | = 1
}
,
which is non-empty and dense in a neighborhood of 0 by Claim C.1 and upper hemi-continuity. By Claim C.2(b), there
exists 휖 ∈ 픙 such that D푓 (푝 +휖) = {Ψ} with휓 ∈ Ψ. Note that D푓 (푝 ′ +휖) = {Ξ′} for some Ξ′ ∈ D푓 (푝 ′) by construction.
Since D푓 is fully substitutable, we must have휓 ∈ Ξ′ ∈ D푓 (푝). Thus, D푓 is decreasing-price fully substitutable for
sales. 
C.3 Proof of Theorem B.1
Clearly SFS implies FS. It remains to prove the converse. Suppose that퐶 푓 is fully substitutable. Lemma C.1 and Claim C.3
imply that 퐶 푓 is increasing-price fully substitutable for sales. Lemma C.1 and Claim C.4 imply that 퐶 푓 is decreasing-
price fully substitutable for sales. Similarly, 퐶 푓 must be decreasing-price and increasing-price fully substitutable for
purchases. Thus, 퐶 푓 is strongly fully substitutable.
D PROOF OF THEOREM ??
The strategy of the proof is to reduce Theorem 1 to a dierent existence result, Theorem D.1.
Theorem D.1. Under FS and BWP, competitive equilibria exist.
We rst modify utility functions so that BWP is satised (Lemma D.1), ensuring that our modication preserves FS
(Lemma D.2). We then show that any competitive equilibrium in the modied economy yields a competitive equilibrium
in the original economy (Lemma D.4). We conclude the proof of Theorem 1 by applying Theorem D.1, which guarantees
that competitive equilibria exist in the modied economy. We then prove Theorem D.1.
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We note that the modication and the lemmata discussed in this section are also used in the proof of Theorem 3.
D.1 The modified economy
For 푓 ∈ 퐹, let
K 푓 = − inf
푢 푓 (Ξ,푡 ) ≥푢 푓 (∅,0)
∑
휔 ∈Ω푓
푡휔 ,
which is nite by BCV. Let Π ≥ 1 +∑푓 ∈퐹 K 푓 be arbitrary.
We modify the economy by giving agents to option to make any trade for a cost of Π.41 Formally, for 푓 ∈ 퐹, dene
푢̂ 푓 : P(Ω푓 ) × RΩ푓 → R by
푢̂ 푓 (Ξ, 푡) = max
Ξ⊆Ψ⊆Ω푓
푢 푓
(
Ψ,
(
푡Ω푓rΨ∪Ξ, (푡 − Π)ΨrΞ
))
.
The function 푢̂ 푓 is clearly continuous and strictly increasing in the RΩ푓 factor. Consider a modied economy in which
utility functions are given by 푢̂ 푓 for 푓 ∈ 퐹 . The remainder of this subsection veries that the modied economy satises
BWP and FS.
We rst show that the modied economy satises BWP. Intuitively, note that this property is precisely what giving
rms the option to make any trade for a cost of Π achieves.
Lemma D.1. Under BCV, the modied economy satises BWP.
Proof. We claim that BWP is satised with 푀 = Π + 1. Let 푓 ∈ 퐹, let 휔 ∈ Ω푓 r Ξ, let Ξ ⊆ Ω푓 , and let 푡 ∈ RΩ푓 be
such that 푡휔 = 0. Note that, for all 휔 ∈ Ψ ⊆ Ω푓 , we have
푢 푓
(
Ψ,
(
푡Ω푓rΨ∪Ξ,−푀휔 , (푡 − Π)ΨrΞr{휔 }
))
< 푢 푓
(
Ψ,
(
푡Ω푓rΨ∪Ξ, (푡 − Π)ΨrΞ
))
whenever 푢 푓
(
Ψ,
(
푡Ω푓rΨ∪Ξ, (푡 − Π)ΨrΞ
))
∈ R, because 푀 > Π = Π − 푡휔 . Hence, we have
푢̂ 푓
(
Ξ ∪ {휔},
(
푡Ω푓r{휔 },−푀휔
))
= max
Ξ∪{휔 }⊆Ψ⊆Ω푓
푢 푓
(
Ψ,
(
푡Ω푓rΨ∪Ξ,−푀휔 , (푡 − Π)ΨrΞr{휔 }
))
< max
Ξ∪{휔 }⊆Ψ⊆Ω푓
푢 푓
(
Ψ,
(
푡Ω푓rΨ∪Ξ, (푡 − Π)ΨrΞr{휔 }
))
≤ max
Ξ⊆Ψ⊆Ω푓
푢 푓
(
Ψ,
(
푡Ω푓rΨ∪Ξ, (푡 − Π)ΨrΞr{휔 }
))
= 푢̂ 푓 (Ξ, 푡) .
Therefore, rm 푓 will never choose a contract (휔, 푝휔 ) with 푝휔 > 푀 (resp. 푝휔 < −푀) if 휔 ∈ Ω→푓 (resp. 휔 ∈ Ω→푓 ).
Since 푓 , 휔, Ξ, and 푡 were arbitrary, the claim follows. 
The following claim, which asserts that giving a rm the option to make one trade for a cost of Π preserves full
substitutability, will be used to prove that FS holds in the modied economy.
Claim D.1. Let Π be a positive real number. Given a utility function 푢 푓 and 휑 ∈ Ω푓 , dene 푢̂ 푓휑 : P(Ω푓 ) → RΩ푓 → R by
푢̂
푓
휑 (Ξ, 푡) = max
{
푢 푓 (Ξ, 푡), 푢 푓
(
Ξ ∪ {휑},
(
푡Ω푓r{휑 }, (푡 − Π)휑
))}
.
41Hateld et al. [2019] show that such trade endowments preserve full substitutability when preferences are quasilinear (see Theorem 2 in Hateld et al.,
2019).
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If 푢 푓 is fully substitutable, then so is 푢̂ 푓휑 .
Proof. The proof of this claim is similar to the proof of Lemma A.2 in Hateld et al. [2013] and uses the notation of
Appendix C.1. Lemma C.1 guarantees thatD푓 is fully substitutable. Let D̂푓 denote the extended demand correspondence
for the utility function 푢̂ 푓휑 . Without loss of generality, assume that 휑 ∈ Ω→푓 .
We rst show that D̂푓 is fully substitutable. Let 푝 ≤ 푝 ′ ∈ P be such that
D̂푓 (푝) = D̂푓 (푝 ′) = 1. Let D̂푓 (푝) = {Ξ}
and let D̂푓 (푝 ′) = {Ξ′}. Dene 푞 ∈ P by
푞 =
(
푝Ω푓r{휔 },min {Π, 푝휔 }휔
)
.
and dene 푞′ ∈ P similarly. Note that 푞 ≤ 푞′ always holds. We divide into cases based on the order between 푝휑 , 푝 ′휑 , and
Π to show that
Ξ′ ∩ {휔 ∈ Ω푓→ | 푝휔 = 푝 ′휔 } ⊆ Ξ
Ξ ∩ {휔 ∈ Ω→푓 | 푝휔 = 푝 ′휔 } ⊆ Ξ′.
(D.1)
Case 1: 푝휑 ≤ 푝 ′휑 ≤ Π. In this case, we have 푝 = 푞, 푝 ′ = 푞′, D̂푓 (푝) = D푓 (푞) and D̂푓 (푝 ′) = D푓 (푞′), and so (D.1)
follows from the full substitutability of D푓 .
Case 2: 푝휑 ≤ Π < 푝 ′휑 . In this case, we have 푝 = 푞 and D̂푓 (푝) = D푓 (푞). Let 휔 ∈ Ω푓→ r Ξ satisfy 푝휔 = 푝 ′휔—note
that 휔 ≠ 휑 by construction. By IFSS, there exists Ψ′ ∈ D푓 (푞′) with 휔 ∉ Ψ′. Since Ξ′ = Ψ′ r {휑}, we have
휔 ∉ Ξ′. Similarly, if 휔 ∈ Ξ→푓 satises 푝휔 = 푝 ′휔 , IFSP implies that there exists Ψ′ ∈ D푓 (푞′) with 휔 ∈ Ψ′. Since
Ξ′ = Ψ′ r {휑}, we have 휔 ∈ Ξ′. (D.1) follows.
Case 3: Π < 푝휑 ≤ 푝 ′휑 . Let Ψ ∈ D푓 (푞) be arbitrary, and note that Ξ = Ψr {휑}. Let 휔 ∈ Ω푓→rΨ satisfy 푝휔 = 푝 ′휔 .
By IFSS, there exists Ψ′ ∈ D푓 (푞′) with 휔 ∉ Ψ′. Since Ξ′ = Ψ′ r {휑}, we have 휔 ∉ Ξ′. Similarly, if 휔 ∈ Ψ→푓
satises 푝휔 = 푝 ′휔 , IFSP implies that there exists Ψ′ ∈ D푓 (푞′) with 휔 ∈ Ψ′. Since Ξ′ = Ψ′ r {휑}, we have 휔 ∈ Ξ′.
(D.1) follows.
The cases exhaust all possibilities, completing the proof that D̂푓 is fully substitutable. By Lemma C.1, 푢̂ 푓휑 must be fully
substitutable as well. 
Claim D.1 and a straightforward inductive argument imply that FS holds in the modied economy.
Lemma D.2. Under FS, the modied economy satises FS.
D.2 Outcomes in the modified economy
This subsection shows that competitive equilibria in the modied economy give rise to competitive equilibria in the
original economy (Lemma D.4). The following lemma, which is also used in the proof of Theorem 3, shows that agent 푓
can only produce K 푓 units of surplus in the modied economy and that trade endowments can only be used at social
cost Π. As will be seen in the proof of Lemma D.4, it follows that trade endowments cannot be used in any competitive
equilibrium.
Lemma D.3. Let Ξ ⊆ Ω푓 and let 푡 ∈ RΩ푓 . Suppose 푢̂ 푓 (Ξ, 푡) ≥ 푢̂ 푓 (∅, 0). Under BCV:
(a) We have
∑
휔 ∈Ω푓 푡휔 ≥ −K 푓 .
(b) If we have 푢 푓 (Ξ, 푡) < 푢̂ 푓 (Ξ, 푡), then we have ∑휔 ∈Ω푓 푡휔 ≥ Π − K 푓 .
Tamás Fleiner, Ravi Jagadeesan, Zsuzsanna Jankó, and Alexander Teytelboym 26
Proof. Note that 푢̂ 푓 (∅, 0) ≥ 푢 푓 (∅, 0) and thus we have 푢̂ 푓 (Ξ, 푡) ≥ 푢 푓 (∅, 0) . Let Ξ ⊆ Ψ ⊆ Ω푓 be such that
푢̂ 푓 (Ξ, 푡) = 푢 푓
(
Ψ,
(
푡Ω푓rΨ∪Ξ, (푡 − Π)ΨrΞ
))
.
The denition of K 푓 implies that
−K 푓 ≤
∑
휔 ∈Ω푓rΨ∪Ξ
푡휔 +
∑
휔 ∈ΨrΞ
(푡휔 − Π) = −Π · |Ψ r Ξ| +
∑
휔 ∈Ω푓
푡휔
so that
|Π | · |Ψ r Ξ| − K 푓 ≤
∑
휔 ∈Ω푓
푡휔 . (D.2)
As |Ψ r Ξ| ≥ 0 always holds, Part (a) follows from (D.2). If 푢 푓 (Ξ, 푡) < 푢̂ 푓 (Ξ, 푡), then we must have Ψ ≠ Ξ. As
|Ψ r Ξ| ≥ 1 in this case, Part (b) follows from (D.2) as well. 
We now show that competitive equilibria in the modied economy give rise to competitive equilibria in the original
economy.
Lemma D.4. Under BCV, any competitive equilibrium in the modied economy is a competitive equilibrium in the original
economy.
Proof. Let [Ξ;푝] be a competitive equilibrium in the modied economy. For 푓 ∈ 퐹, let 푡 푓 =
(
푝Ξ푓→ , (−푝)Ξ→푓 , 0Ω푓rΞ
)
.
Since [Ξ;푝] is a competitive equilibrium in the modied economy, we have 푢̂ 푓 (Ξ푓 , 푡 푓 ) ≥ 푢̂ 푓 (∅, 0) for all 푓 ∈ 퐹 . Note
that ∑
푓 ∈퐹
∑
휔 ∈Ω푓
푡
푓
휔 =
∑
푓 ∈퐹
∑
휔 ∈Ξ푓
푡
푓
휔 =
∑
휔 ∈Ξ
(푝휔 − 푝휔 ) = 0.
In light of the fact that Π >
∑
푓 ∈퐹 K 푓 , it follows from Lemma D.3 that 푢 푓 (Ξ푓 , 푡 푓 ) ≥ 푢̂ 푓 (Ξ푓 , 푡 푓 ) for all 푓 ∈ 퐹 .
Let 푓 ∈ 퐹 be arbitrary. For any Ψ ⊆ Ω푓 , we have
푢 푓 (Ξ푓 , 푡 푓 ) ≥ 푢̂ 푓 (Ξ푓 , 푡 푓 ) ≥ 푢̂ 푓
(
Ψ,
(
푝Ψ푓→ , (−푝)Ψ→푓 , 0Ω푓rΨ
))
≥ 푢 푓
(
Ψ,
(
푝Ψ푓→ , (−푝)Ψ→푓 , 0Ω푓rΨ
))
,
where the second inequality is because [Ξ;푝] is a competitive equilibrium in the modied economy and the third
inequality follows from the denition of 푢̂ 푓 . It follows that Ξ푓 ∈ 퐷 푓 (푝). Since 푓 was arbitrary, [Ξ; 푝] is a competitive
equilibrium in the original economy. 
D.3 Completion of the proof of Theorem 1
Theorem D.1 and Lemmata D.1 and D.2 imply the modied economy has a competitive equilibrium [Ξ;푝], which is a
competitive equilibrium in the original economy by Lemma D.4.
D.4 Proof of Theorem D.1
Let 푀 be as in BWP. Intuitively, we consider a grid of size 휖 in [−2푀, 2푀]Ω, chosen so that there are no indierences.
We then use the Gale-Shapley operator of Hateld and Kominers [2012] and Fleiner et al. [2018b] to produce an
휖-equilibrium. Sending 휖 → 0, we obtain a competitive equilibrium.
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Formally, a vector 훿 ∈ (−휖, 휖)Ω is 휖-regular if 퐷 푓 is single-valued on [−2푀, 2푀]Ω푓 ∩
(
휖ZΩ푓 + 훿Ω푓
)
for all 푓 ∈ 퐹 .
The following claim asserts that there are many regular vectors.
Claim D.2. For any 휖 > 0, the set of 휖-regular vectors is dense in (−휖, 휖)Ω .
Proof. For a rm 푓 ∈ 퐹, let
픖푓 =
{
푝 ∈ RΩ |
퐷 푓 (푝Ω푓 ) = 1} ,
which is open and dense in RΩ푓 by Claim C.1. Let 푛 =
⌊ 2푀
휖
⌋ + 1 and let 푇 = ( [−푛, 푛] ∩ Z)Ω .
Note that 훿 is 휖-regular if 훿 + 휖푇 ⊆ 픖푓 . For any 픱 ∈ 푇 , the set of vectors 훿 such that 훿 + 휖픱 ∈ 픖푓 is open and dense in
(−휖, 휖)Ω since픖푓 is open and dense in RΩ푓 . As 푇 is nite, it follows that the set of 휖-regular vectors contains an open
and dense subset of (−휖, 휖)Ω . 
An arrangement [Ξ;푝] is an 휖-equilibrium if every agent 푓 demands Ξ푓 when given access to all sales, as well as
purchases in Ξ, at prices 푝 , and other purchases at prices 푝 + 휖 .
Denition D.1. An arrangement [Ξ;푝] is an 휖-equilibrium if 푝 ∈ [−2푀, 2푀]Ω푓 and Ξ ∈ 퐷 푓
(
푝ˆ 푓 ,Ξ,휖
)
for all 푓 , where
푝ˆ
푓 ,Ξ,휖
휔 =

푝휔 if 휔 ∈ Ξ or 푓 = s(휔)
푝휔 + 휖 if 휔 ∉ Ξ and 푓 = b(휔)
.
The following claim shows that 휖-equilibria exist.
Claim D.3. For all 0 < 휖 < 푀, under FS and BWP, there exists an 휖-equilibrium.
Proof. Let 훿 be an 휖-regular vector, which exists by Claim D.2. Let P휔 = [−2푀, 2푀] ∩ (휖Z + 훿휔 ) , and let
푋̂ =
⋃
휔 ∈Ω
({휔} × P휔 ) ⊆ 푋 .
Note that 퐶 푓 is single-valued on P
(
푋̂푓
)
by 휖-regularity, and so write 퐶 푓 (푌 ) = {C푓 (푌 )} for 푌 ⊆ 푋̂푓 .
Following Hateld and Kominers [2012], dene Φ : P
(
푋̂
)2 → P (푋̂ )2 by
Φ(푋퐵, 푋푆 ) =
(
Φ퐵 (푋퐵, 푋푆 ),Φ푆 (푋퐵, 푋푆 )
)
Φ퐵 (푋퐵, 푋푆 ) = (푋̂ r 푋푆 ) ∪
⋃
푓 ∈퐹
C푓
(
푋퐵→푓 ∪ 푋푆푓→
)
푓→
Φ푆 (푋퐵, 푋푆 ) = (푋̂ r 푋퐵) ∪
⋃
푓 ∈퐹
C푓
(
푋퐵→푓 ∪ 푋푆푓→
)
→푓 .
As in Fleiner [2003], Hateld and Milgrom [2005], Hateld and Kominers [2012], and Fleiner et al. [2018b], order P
(
푋̂
)2
by letting (푋퐵, 푋푆 ) v (푋¯퐵, 푋¯푆 ) if 푋퐵 ⊇ 푋¯퐵 and 푋푆 ⊆ 푋¯푆 . As Hateld and Kominers [2012] and Fleiner et al. [2018b]
have shown, Φ is isotone (with respect to v) under FS. The Tarski [1955] xed point theorem guarantees that Φ has a
xed point (푋퐵, 푋푆 ).
Given 푓 ∈ 퐹, since (푋퐵, 푋푆 ) is a xed-point of Φ, we have
푋퐵푓→ = (푋̂푓→ r 푋푆푓→) ∪ C푓
(
푋퐵→푓 ∪ 푋푆푓→
)
푓→ . (D.3)
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Since C푓
(
푋퐵→푓 ∪ 푋푆푓→
)
푓→ ⊆ 푋
푆
푓→, it follows that 푋
퐵
푓→ ∪ 푋푆푓→ = 푋̂푓→. Taking unions over 푓 , we have
푋̂ =
⋃
푓 ∈퐹
푋푓→ =
⋃
푓 ∈퐹
(
푋퐵푓→ ∪ 푋푆푓→
)
= 푋퐵 ∪ 푋푆 . (D.4)
(D.3) also implies that
푋퐵푓→ ∩ 푋푆푓→ = C푓
(
푋퐵→푓 ∪ 푋푆푓→
)
푓→ .
Similarly, we have
푋퐵→푓 ∩ 푋푆→푓 = C푓
(
푋퐵→푓 ∪ 푋푆푓→
)
→푓 ,
and it follows that
(푋퐵 ∩ 푋푆 )푓 = C푓
(
푋퐵→푓 ∪ 푋푆푓→
)
. (D.5)
Let휔 ∈ Ω be arbitrary. Since 휖 < 푀 , we have max P휔 > 푀 and min P휔 < −푀. Thus, we have (휔,max P휔 ), (휔,min P휔 ) ∉
푋퐵 ∩ 푋푆 by BWP and (D.5). If (휔,maxP휔 ) ∉ 푋퐵, then adding (휔,maxP휔 ) to 푋퐵 and removing it from 푋푆 preserves
(D.4) and (D.5) by BWP for 푓 = s(휔). Thus, we can assume that (휔,max P휔 ) ∈ 푋퐵 r푋푆 . Similarly, we can assume that
(휔,minP휔 ) ∈ 푋푆 r 푋퐵 . Dene
푝휔 = max
{
푝 ′휔 | (휔, 푝 ′휔 ) ∈ 푋푆
}
,
which exists as P휔 is nite and (휔,minP휔 ) ∈ 푋푆 .
We claim that [Ξ;푝] is an 휖-equilibrium, where Ξ = 휏 (푋퐵 ∩ 푋푆 ) . Note that since (휔,maxP휔 ) ∉ 푋푆 for all 휔 ∈ Ω,
we have 푝ˆ 푓 ,Ξ,휖휔 ∈ P휔 for all 휔 ∈ Ω and 푓 ∈ 퐹 . The denition of 푝휔 also ensures that
(
휔, 푝ˆ
b(휔),Ξ,휖
휔
)
∈ 푋퐵 and(
휔, 푝ˆ
s(휔),Ξ,휖
휔
)
= (휔, 푝휔 ) ∈ 푋푆 for all 휔 ∈ Ω. It follows that
(
푋퐵 ∩ 푋푆
)
푓
⊆ 휅
( [
Ω푓 ; 푝ˆ 푓 ,Ξ,휖
] )
⊆ 푋퐵→푓 ∪ 푋푆푓→ for all
푓 ∈ 퐹 . Hence, (D.5) implies that Ξ푓 ∈ 퐷 푓
(
푝ˆ 푓 ,Ξ,휖
)
for all 푓 ∈ 퐹, so that [Ξ; 푝] is an 휖-equilibrium. 
As [−2푀, 2푀] is sequentially compact, Claim D.3 implies that there exists an arrangement [Ξ;푝], a sequence
푛1 < 푛2 < · · · of positive integers, and a sequence 푝1, 푝2, . . . ∈ [−2푀, 2푀]Ω such that [Ξ;푝푘 ] is a 1푛푘 -equilibrium for
all 푘 and 푝푘 → 푝. Note that 푝ˆ
푓 ,Ξ, 1푛푘
푘
→ 푝Ω푓 for all 푓 ∈ 퐹 because 1푛푘 → 0. Because Ξ푓 ∈ 퐷 푓
(
푝ˆ
푓 ,Ξ, 1푛푘
푘
)
for all 푘 and
퐷 푓 is upper hemi-continuous, it follows that Ξ푓 ∈ 퐷 푓
(
푝Ω푓
)
for all 푓 ∈ 퐹 . Thus, [Ξ;푝] is a competitive equilibrium.
E OTHER PROOFS OMITTED FROM THE TEXT
E.1 Proof of Theorem 2
Competitive equilibrium outcomes are clearly individually rational. It remains to show that no trail locally blocks a
competitive equilibrium outcome. Let [Ξ;푝] be a competitive equilibrium and let 퐴 = 휅 ( [Ξ;푝]). Suppose for the sake
of deriving a contradiction that there is a locally blocking trail (푧1, . . . , 푧푛).
Let 푧푖 = (휔푖 , 푝 ′푖 ). Let 푓푖 = s(푥푖 ) and let 푓푛+1 = b(푥푛). As퐴푓1 ∉ 퐶 푓1 (퐴푓1 ∪{푥1}) and [Ξ;푝] is a competitive equilibrium,
we must have 푝 ′1 > 푝휔1 . Similarly, we must have 푝
′
2 > 푝휔2 . A simple inductive argument shows that 푝
′
푛 > 푝휔푛 . But we
must have 푝 ′푛 < 푝휔푛 since 퐴푓푛+1 ∉ 퐶 푓푛+1 (퐴푓푛+1 ∪ {푥푛}) . Thus, there are no locally blocking trails.
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E.2 Proof of Proposition 1
We adapt the proof of Lemma 5(ii) in Fleiner et al. [2018b] to our setting. Inspired by Fleiner et al. [2018b], we say that
a circuit (푧1, . . . , 푧푛) is locally blocking if every pair of adjacent contracts is demanded by their common agent in every
choice set.
Denition E.1. Let 푌 be an outcome. A sequence of contracts (푧1, . . . , 푧푛) is a locally blocking circuit if:
• for all 1 ≤ 푖 ≤ 푛, we have {푧푖−1, 푧푖 } ⊆푊 for all푊 ∈ 퐶 푓푖
(
푌푓푖 ∪ {푧푖−1, 푧푖 }
)
, where 푓푖 = s(푧푖 ) = b(푧푖−1).
Here, we write 푧0 = 푧푛 .
To prove Proposition 1, we show (as in Fleiner et al., 2018b) that every shortest locally blocking circuit or locally
blocking trail gives rise to a blocking set.
Claim E.1. Let 푌 be an individually rational outcome. Under FS, if (푧1, . . . , 푧푛) is shortest among all locally blocking
circuits and locally blocking trails for 푌, then the set {푧1, . . . , 푧푛} blocks 푌 .
Proof. We prove the contrapositive of the claim. Suppose that (푧1, . . . , 푧푛) is a locally blocking circuit or locally
blocking trail. If (푧1, . . . , 푧푛) is a locally blocking trail and there exists 푊 ∈ 퐶 푓푖+1 ({푧푖 , 푧푖+1}) with 푧푖 ∉ 푊, then
(푧푖+1, . . . , 푧푛) is a locally blocking trail. Similarly, if (푧1, . . . , 푧푛) is a locally blocking trail and there exists 푊 ∈
퐶 푓푖+1 ({푧푖 , 푧푖+1}) with 푧푖+1 ∉푊, then (푧1, . . . , 푧푖 ) is a locally blocking trail.
Now, suppose that 푍 = {푧1, . . . , 푧푛} does not block 푌 . Then, there is a rm 푓 , a contract 푧 푗 ∈ 푍 푓 , and a set
푊 ∈ 퐶 푓
(
푌푓 ∪ 푍 푓
)
with 푧 푗 ∉푊 . Without loss of generality, we can assume that 푓 = s(푧 푗 ), so that 푓 = 푓푗 . We show that
there is a locally blocking circuit or locally blocking trail that is shorter than (푧1, . . . , 푧푛). By the logic of the previous
paragraph, we can assume that {푧푖 , 푧푖+1} ⊆푊 for all푊 ∈ 퐶 푓푖+1 ({푧푖 , 푧푖+1}) if (푧1, . . . , 푧푛) is a locally blocking trail, as
otherwise there is a shorter locally blocking trail.
By Theorem B.1, SFS must be satised. We divide into cases based on whether 푗 = 1 and whether we have a trail or a
circuit to complete the proof of the claim.
Case 1: 푗 = 1 and (푧1, . . . , 푧푛) is a locally blocking trail. By IFSS, there exists푊 ′ ∈ 퐶 푓 (푌푓 ∪ 푍 푓→) with 푧1 ∉푊 ′.
Among all such푊 ′, take푊 to minimize |푊 ′ r 푌푓 |. As 푌푓 ∉ 퐶 푓 (푌푓 ∪ {푧1}), we have 푌푓 ∉ 퐶 푓 (푌푓 ∪ 푍 푓→), and
hence푊 ′ * 푌푓 .
Let 푧푘 ∈ 푊 r 푌푓 be arbitrary. By IFSS, we must have 푌푓 ∉ 퐶 푓 (푌푓 ∪ {푧푘 }), so that (푧푘 , . . . , 푧푛) is a shorter
locally blocking trail.
Case 2: 푗 ≠ 1 or (푧1, . . . , 푧푛) is a locally blocking circuit. In either case, 푧 푗−1 is well-dened. By IFSS, there exists
푊 ′ ∈ 퐶 푓 (푌푓 ∪ {푧 푗−1} ∪푍 푓→) with 푧 푗 ∉푊 ′. Among all such푊 ′, take푊 to minimize |푊 ′r푌푓 |. As {푧 푗−1, 푧 푗 } ⊆ 퐵
for all 퐵 ∈ 퐶 푓 (푌푓 ∪ {푧 푗−1, 푧 푗 }), we have 푧 푗−1 ∈푊 by DFSP.
Let 푧푘 ∈ 푊 r 푌푓 be arbitrary. By IFSS, we must have 푧푘 ∈ 퐵 for all 퐵 ∈ 퐶 푓 (푌푓 ∪ {푧 푗−1, 푧푘 }). If 푘 < 푗, then
(푧푘 , . . . , 푧 푗−1) is a shorter locally blocking circuit. If 푘 > 푗, then (푧1, . . . , 푧 푗−1, 푧푘 , . . . , 푧푛) is a shorter locally blocking
circuit or locally blocking trail.
The cases exhaust all possibilities, completing the proof of the claim. 
Claim E.1 implies Proposition 1.
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E.3 Proof of Theorem 3
Let 퐴 be any stable outcome, and let Ξ = 휏 (퐴). For 휔 ∈ 휏 (퐴), let 푝휔 be the unique price such that (휔, 푝휔 ) ∈ 퐴.
For 푓 ∈ 퐹, let
K 푓 = − inf
푢 푓 (Ξ,푡 ) ≥푢 푓 (∅,0)
∑
휔 ∈Ω푓
푡휔 ,
which is nite by BCV. Let
Π = 1 +
∑
푓 ∈퐹
K 푓 + 2
∑
휔 ∈Ξ
|푝휔 |.
Recall the denition of 푢̂ 푓 : P(Ω푓 ) × RΩ푓 → R from the proof of Theorem 1, which is
푢̂ 푓 (Ξ, 푡) = max
Ξ⊆Ψ⊆Ω푓
푢 푓
(
Ψ,
(
푡Ω푓rΨ∪Ξ, (푡 − Π)ΨrΞ
))
.
Consider a modied economy in which utility functions are given by 푢̂ 푓 for 푓 ∈ 퐹 .
Claim E.2. The outcome 퐴 is stable in the modied economy.
Proof. The outcome 퐴 is clearly individually rational in the modied economy. It remains to prove that 퐴 is not
blocked in the modied economy. Suppose for the sake of deriving a contradiction that there is a blocking set 푍 in the
modied economy.
Let 퐶̂ 푓 denote the choice function of 푓 in the modied economy. For 푓 ∈ 퐹 and 푌 푓 ∈ 퐶̂ 푓 (퐴푓 ∪ 푍 푓 ), note that
푈 푓
(
푌 푓
)
≥ 푈 푓 (∅) and thus
−K 푓 ≤
∑
(휔,푝′휔 ) ∈푌 푓푓→
푝 ′휔 −
∑
(휔,푝′휔 ) ∈푌 푓→푓
푝 ′휔 ≤
∑
(휔,푝′휔 ) ∈푍푓→
푝 ′휔 −
∑
(휔,푝′휔 ) ∈푍→푓
푝 ′휔 +
∑
휔 ∈Ξ푓
|푝휔 |,
where the rst inequality is due to Lemma D.3(a), so that∑
(휔,푝′휔 ) ∈푍푓→
푝 ′휔 −
∑
(휔,푝′휔 ) ∈푍→푓
푝 ′휔 +
∑
휔 ∈Ξ푓
|푝휔 | + K 푓 ≥ 0.
But note that ∑
푓 ∈퐹
©­«
∑
(휔,푝′휔 ) ∈푍푓→
푝 ′휔 −
∑
(휔,푝′휔 ) ∈푍→푓
푝 ′휔 +
∑
휔 ∈Ξ푓
|푝휔 | + K 푓 ª®¬ = 2
∑
휔 ∈Ξ
|푝휔 | +
∑
푓 ∈퐹
K 푓 = Π − 1.
It follows that ∑
(휔,푝′휔 ) ∈푍푓→
푝 ′휔 −
∑
(휔,푝′휔 ) ∈푍→푓
푝 ′휔 +
∑
휔 ∈Ξ푓
|푝휔 | + K 푓 ≤ Π − 1 < Π
for all 푓 ∈ 퐹, so that ∑
(휔,푝′휔 ) ∈푌 푓푓→
푝 ′휔 −
∑
(휔,푝′휔 ) ∈푌 푓→푓
푝 ′휔 ≤ −K 푓 + Π − 1 < −K 푓 + Π.
Hence, Lemma D.3(b) implies that 푈̂ 푓
(
푌 푓
)
= 푈 푓
(
푌 푓
)
for all 푓 ∈ 퐹 .
Let푊 ∈ 퐶 푓 (퐴푓 ∪ 푍 푓 ) be arbitrary. In light of the previous paragraph and the fact that푈 푓 (푊 ) ≤ 푈̂ 푓 (푊 ), we must
have푊 ∈ 퐶̂ 푓 (퐴푓 ∪ 푍 푓 ). Since 푍 blocks 퐴 in the modied economy, we must have 푍 푓 ⊆푊 . Hence, 푍 blocks 퐴 in the
original economy, which contradicts the hypothesis that 퐴 is stable in the original economy. 
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Claim E.2 guarantees that 퐴 is stable in the modied economy. By Proposition 1, 퐴 is trail-stable in the modied
economy. Lemmata D.1 and D.2 ensure that FS and BCV are satised in the modied economy. Hence, there exists a com-
petitive equilibrium [Ξ;푝] in the modied economy with 휅 ( [Ξ;푝]) = 퐴 by Theorem 4 (which is proved independently).
Lemma D.4 guarantees that [Ξ;푝] is a competitive equilibrium in the modied economy.
E.4 Proof of Theorem 4
We set prices for unrealized trades that are as high as possible while remaining (weakly) undesirable to sellers. Call a
trail (푧1, . . . , 푧푛) locally semi-blocking if the seller of 푧푖 wants to propose 푧푖 when given access to 푧푖−1 for all 푖 > 1, and
the seller of 푧1 wants to propose 푧1. We consider a contract desirable to a seller if it appears in a locally semi-blocking
trail.
Denition E.2. A trail (푧1, . . . , 푧푛) locally semi-blocks an outcome 퐴 if:
• 퐴푓1 ∉ 퐶 푓1 (퐴푓1 ∪ {푧1}), where 푓1 = s(푧1);
• {푧푖 , 푧푖+1} ⊆ 푌 for all 푌 ∈ 퐶 푓푖+1 (퐴푓푖+1 ∪ {푧푖 , 푧푖+1}) for 1 ≤ 푖 ≤ 푛 − 1, where 푓푖+1 = b(푧푖 ) = s(푧푖+1) .
Formally, let 퐴 be an outcome and let Ξ = 휏 (퐴). Let 푀 be as in BWP. Let 푋퐵 be the set of contracts that appear
in some locally semi-blocking trail. Thus, 푋퐵 consists of all contracts that are strictly desirable to their sellers.42 For
휔 ∈ Ω, dene
푝휔 = min
{
푀, inf
(휔,푝′휔 ) ∈푋퐵
푝 ′휔
}
, (E.1)
so that 푝휔 is the minimum of 푀 and the highest price at which 휔 is weakly undesirable to its seller. We prove that
휅 ( [Ξ;푝]) = 퐴 and that [Ξ;푝] is a competitive equilibrium.
Claim E.3. Under BWP, if 퐴 is individually rational, then we have 휅 ( [Ξ;푝]) = 퐴.
Proof. Suppose that (휔, 푝 ′휔 ) ∈ 퐴. BWP implies that 푝 ′휔 < 푀 . As 푢s(휔) is strictly increasing in transfers and 퐴 is
individually rational, we have (휔, 푝 ′′휔 ) ∈ 푋퐵 if and only if 푝 ′′휔 > 푝 ′휔 . It follows that 푝휔 = 푝 ′휔 . Since 휔 ∈ Ξ was arbitrary,
the claim follows. 
Claim E.4. Under FS and BWP, if 퐴 is trail-stable, then [Ξ;푝] is a competitive equilibrium.
Proof. Suppose for the sake of deriving a contradiction that Ξ푓 ∉ 퐷 푓
(
푝Ω푓
)
. As퐴 is individually rational, it follows
from Claim E.3 that Ξ′ ∉ 퐷 푓
(
푝Ω푓
)
for all Ξ′ ⊆ Ξ푓 .
We perturb prices slightly to ensure that sellers have strict incentives to propose contracts. Due to the upper
hemi-continuity of demand, we can ensure that a suciently small perturbation does not aect the property that 푓
demands no subset of Ξ푓 . Formally, dene
픒 = {푝 ′ ∈ RΩ푓 | 퐷 푓 (푝 ′) ∩ P(Ξ푓 ) = ∅}.
Since 퐷 푓 is upper hemi-continuous, the set 픒 contains an open neighborhood of 푝Ω푓 . By (E.1), there exists 푞 ∈ 픒
such that 푞Ξ푓 ∪Ω푓→ = 푝Ξ푓 ∪Ω푓→ , we have 푞휔 = 푝휔 whenever 푝휔 = 푀, and (휔, 푝휔 ) ∈ 푋퐵 whenever 휔 ∈ Ω→푓 r Ξ and
푝휔 < 푀. We consider the prices 푞 instead of the prices 푝 .
By Theorem B.1, SFS must be satised. To produce a contradiction, we consider the set of trades that 푓 could demand
at price vector 푞 that contains fewest trades outside Ξ푓 . Formally, let Ψ ∈ 퐷 푓 (푞) minimize |Ψ′rΞ| over all Ψ′ ∈ 퐷 푓 (푞) .
42In the xed-point interpretation of trail-stable outcomes [Adachi, 2017, Fleiner et al., 2018b],푋퐵 is the set of contracts that are available to their buyers.
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Consider the corresponding set of contracts푊 = 휅 ( [Ψ;푞]). Note that푊 * 퐴 and푊→푓 r퐴 ⊆ 푋퐵 by construction and
BWP. We divide into cases based on whether푊 r퐴 contains any contracts that are sold by 푓 to produce a contradiction.
Case 1: 푊 r퐴 * 푋→푓 . In this case, we either produce a locally blocking trail or show that any sale in푊 r퐴
must appear in some locally semi-blocking trail. Formally, let 푧 ∈푊푓→ r퐴푓→ be arbitrary and let 휔 = 휏 (푧). By
IFSS, we have 푧 ∈푊 ′ for all푊 ′ ∈ 퐶 푓 (퐴 ∪ {푧} ∪푊→푓 ). Let푊 0 ∈ 퐶 푓 (퐴 ∪ {푧} ∪푊→푓 ) minimize |푊 ′ r퐴| over all
푊 ′ ∈ 퐶 푓 (퐴 ∪ {푧} ∪푊→푓 ) .
As 푞휔 = 푝휔 , the trail ((휔, 푝 ′휔 )) cannot be locally semi-blocking for any 푝 ′휔 < 푞휔 by (E.1). Hence, we have
that 퐴푓 ∈ 퐶 푓 (퐴푓 ∪ {푧}) by the upper hemi-continuity of demand. It follows that 푊 0→푓 r 퐴→푓 ≠ ∅. Since
푊→푓 r 퐴 ⊆ 푋퐵, there must exist a locally semi-blocking trail (푧1, . . . , 푧푛) with 푧푛 ∈ 푊 0→푓 . By DFSP, we have
푧푛 ∈푊 ′ for all푊 ′ ∈ 퐶 푓 (퐴푓 ∪ {푧푛, 푧}). We divide into cases based on whether there exists푊 ′′ ∈ 퐶 푓 (퐴푓 ∪ {푧푛, 푧})
with 푧 ∉푊 ′′ to derive contradictions.
Subcase 1.1: There exists푊 ′′ ∈ 퐶 푓 (퐴푓 ∪{푧푛, 푧}) with 푧 ∉푊 ′′. Then, the trail (푧1, . . . , 푧푛) is locally blocking,
contradicting the assumption that 퐴 is trail-stable.
Subcase 1.2: 푧 ∈ 푊 ′′ for all푊 ′′ ∈ 퐶 푓 (퐴푓 ∪ {푧푛, 푧}) . Then, (푧1, . . . , 푧푛, 푧) is a locally semi-blocking trail.
Since 푢 푓 is continuous, there exists 푝 ′휔 < 푝휔 such that (푧1, . . . , 푧푛, (휔, 푝 ′휔 )) is a locally semi-blocking
trail, contradicting (E.1).
Case 2: 푊 r 퐴 ⊆ 푋→푓 . Let 푧 ∈ 푊 r 퐴 be arbitrary, and let (푧1, . . . , 푧푛) be a locally semi-blocking trail with
푧푛 = 푧. By DFSP, we have 퐴푓 ∉ 퐶 푓 (퐴푓 ∪ {푧}). Thus, (푧1, . . . , 푧푛) is a locally blocking trail, contradicting the
assumption that 퐴 is trail-stable.
The cases exhaust all possibilities. We have produced contradictions in all cases, completing the proof of the claim. 
Claims E.3 and E.4 together imply the theorem.
E.5 Proof of Corollary 2
Competitive equilibria exist by Theorem D.1. Competitive equilibrium outcomes are trail-stable by Theorem 2. Trail-
stable outcomes lift to competitive equilibria by Theorem 4.
E.6 Proof of Theorem 5
We prove the contrapositive. Let [Ξ;푝] be an arrangement and suppose that 퐴 = 휅 ( [Ξ;푝]) is not strongly group stable.
If 퐴 is not individually rational, then clearly [Ξ;푝] is not a competitive equilibrium. Thus, we can assume that 퐴 is not
strongly unblocked—that is, that there exists a non-empty set of contracts 푍 ⊆ 푋 r퐴 and, for each 푓 ∈ 퐹 with 푍 푓 ≠ ∅,
a set of contracts 푌 푓 ⊆ 푍 푓 ∪퐴푓 with 푌 푓 ⊇ 푍 푓 and푈 푓
(
푌 푓
)
> 푈 푓
(
퐴푓
)
(see Denition 6).
Let 퐹 ′ = {푓 ∈ 퐹 | 푍 푓 ≠ ∅}. For each 푓 ∈ 퐹 ′, let
M 푓 = sup
푞
푢 푓 ©­­«휏 (푌 푓 ),
∑
휔 ∈휏 (푌 푓 )푓→
푝휔 −
∑
휔 ∈휏 (푌 푓 )→푓
푝휔 − 푞
ª®®¬ ≥ 푈 푓
(
퐴푓
) 
denote the negative of the compensating variation for 푓 from the change from 휏 (퐴푓 ) to 휏 (푌 푓 ) at price vector 푝 . For
휔 ∈ 휏 (푍 ), let 푝˜휔 be the unique price such that (휔, 푝˜휔 ) ∈ 푍 . Dene 푝˜휔 = 푝휔 for 휔 ∈ Ω r 휏 (푍 ). The denition of 푌 푓
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ensures that
푢 푓
©­­«휏 (푌 푓 ),
∑
휔 ∈휏 (푌 푓 )푓→
푝˜휔 −
∑
휔 ∈휏 (푌 푓 )→푓
푝˜휔
ª®®¬ > 푈 푓
(
퐴푓
)
for all 푓 ∈ 퐹 ′. It follows that
M 푓 >
∑
휔 ∈휏 (푌 푓 )푓→
푝휔 −
∑
휔 ∈휏 (푌 푓 )→푓
푝휔 −
∑
휔 ∈휏 (푌 푓 )푓→
푝˜휔 +
∑
휔 ∈휏 (푌 푓 )→푓
푝˜휔
=
∑
휔 ∈휏 (푌 푓 )푓→
(푝휔 − 푝˜휔 ) +
∑
휔 ∈휏 (푌 푓 )→푓
(푝˜휔 − 푝휔 ).
Because 푝휔 = 푝˜휔 for 휔 ∉ 푍 and 푍 푓 ⊆ 푌 푓 , we have
M 푓 >
∑
휔 ∈휏 (푍푓 )푓→
(푝휔 − 푝˜휔 ) +
∑
휔 ∈휏 (푍푓 )→푓
(푝˜휔 − 푝휔 ).
Summing over 푓 ∈ 퐹 ′, we have ∑푓 ∈퐹 ′M 푓 > 0. Thus, there exists 푓 ∈ 퐹 ′ withM 푓 > 0. For such 푓 , we have
푢 푓
(
휏 (푌 푓 ),
(
푝휏 (푌 푓 )푓→ , (−푝)휏 (푌 푓 )→푓 , 0Ω푓r휏 (푌 푓 )
))
> 푈 푓
(
퐴푓
)
= 푢 푓
(
Ξ푓 ,
(
푝Ξ푓→ , (−푝)Ξ→푓 , 0Ω푓rΞ
))
,
so that Ξ푓 ∉ 퐷 푓
(
푝Ω푓
)
. Therefore, [Ξ;푝] is not a competitive equilibrium.
E.7 Proof of Corollary 3
Competitive equilibrium outcomes exist and coincide with trail-stable outcomes by Corollary 2, and are strongly group
stable by Theorem 5. Strongly group stable outcomes are always stable. Stable outcomes are trail-stable by Proposition 1.
E.8 Proof of Corollary 4
Competitive equilibria exist by Theorem 1. Competitive equilibrium outcomes are strongly group stable by Theorem 5.
Strongly group stable outcomes are always stable. Stable outcomes lift to competitive equilibria by Theorem 3.
E.9 Proof of Lemma A.1
The proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 7 in Hateld and Kominers [2012]. By Theorem B.1 in Appendix B, we can
assume that SFS is satised.
We prove the contrapositive. Let 퐴 be outcome that is not stable. If 퐴 is not individually rational, then clearly 퐴 is
not trail-stable. Thus, we can assume that 퐴 is blocked by a non-empty blocking set 푍 .
Since 푍 is non-empty and the network is assumed to be acyclic, there is a rm 푓1 with 푍→푓1 = ∅ and 푍 푓1→ ≠ ∅. Let
푧1 ∈ 푍 푓1→ be arbitrary. By IFSS, we have 퐴푓1 ∉ 퐶 푓1 (퐴푓1 ∪ {푧1}). Let 푓2 = b(푧1).
If 퐴푓2 ∉ 퐶
푓2 (퐴푓2 ∪ {푧1}), then (푧1) is a locally blocking trail. Thus, we can assume that 퐴푓2 ∈ 퐶 푓2
(
퐴푓2 ∪ {푧1}
)
. DFSP
implies that 푧1 ∈푊 ′ for all푊 ′ ∈ 퐶 푓2 (퐴푓2 ∪{푧1}∪푍 푓2→) . Let푊 ∈ 퐶 푓2 (퐴푓2 ∪{푧1}∪푍 푓2→) minimize |푊 ′r퐴| among all
푊 ′ ∈ 퐶 푓2 (퐴푓2∪{푧1}∪푍 푓2→) . By IFSS, we must have푊 = {푧1, 푧2} for some 푧2 ∈ 푍 푓2→. Note that퐴푓2 ∉ 퐶 푓2 (퐴푓2∪{푧1, 푧2})
by construction.
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A similar argument to the previous paragraph shows that (푧1, 푧2) is a locally blocking trail or there exists 푧3 ∈ 푍
with s(푧3) = b(푧2) such that 퐴푓2 ∉ 퐶 푓2 (퐴푓2 ∪ {푧2, 푧3}) . By induction and due to acyclicity, we obtain a locally blocking
trail. Thus, 퐴 is not trail-stable.
F EXAMPLES OMITTED FROM THE TEXT
The following two examples remove the frictions from Examples 1 and 2, respectively, showing that competitive
equilibrium cannot be Pareto-comparable and that adding an outside option that is not used cannot shut down trade.
Thus, distortionary frictions are crucial to the conclusions of Examples 1 and 2.
Example 3 continued (Cyclic economy with transferable utility). In Example 3, the competitive equilibria are [{휁 ,휓 };푝] ,
where
푝휁 − 푝휓  ≤ 10. All competitive equilibria are Pareto-ecient, as guaranteed by the First Welfare Theorem (see,
e.g., Hateld et al. [2013]), and trade occurs in every competitive equilibrium.
Example F.1 (Cyclic economy with transferable utility and an outside trade—Hateld and Kominers, 2012). As depicted
in Figure 2(b), consider the economy of Example 3 with an additional rm 푓3, which interacts with 푓1 via trade 휔 ′. Firm
푓푖 has utility function
푢 푓푖 (Ξ, 푡) = 푣 푓푖 (Ξ) +
∑
휔 ∈Ω푓
푡휔 ,
where valuations 푣 푓1 , 푣 푓2 , and 푣 푓3 are as in Example 2.
Trade 휁 ′ cannot be realized in equilibrium due to the technological constraints of 푓1 and 푓2 . Hence, we must have
푝휁 ′ ≥ 300 in any competitive equilibrium, since 푓3 must weakly prefer ∅ over {휁 ′} in equilibrium. In order for trade to
occur, 푓1 must prefer 휁 over 휁 ′, and so we must have 푝휁 ≥ 푝휁 ′ . Hence, the competitive equilibria are [{휁 ,휓 }; 푝] , where
|푝휁 − 푝휓 | ≤ 10 and 푝휁 ≥ 푝휁 ′ ≥ 300. Essentially, adding an outside option simply forces 푝휁 to be at least $300 without
shutting down trade between 푓1 and 푓2 .
The next example shows that a regularity condition, such as BCV, is needed in addition to FS to ensure that
competitive equilibria exist.
Example F.2 (Competitive equilibria need not exist under FS alone). Consider two rms, 푏 and 푠, and one trade 휔
between them with s(휔) = 푠 and b(휔) = 푏. Suppose that 푠 is not willing to sell 휔 at any (nite) price, but 푏 would buy 휔
at any (nite) price. Note that the market does not clear at any price—푏 always demands 휔 and 푠 never demands 휔. The
issue is that the variation needed to exactly compensate 푏 for going from autarky to trade is −∞. If 푏’s compensating
variation were −푝, then autarky could be sustained in equilibrium at any price above 푝 .
The last example shows that FS needed for stable outcomes to be trail-stable.
Example F.3 (Stable outcomes may not be trail-stable without FS). As depicted in Figure 2(a), there are two rms, 푓1
and 푓2, which interact via two trades, 휁 and휓 . Firm 푓푖 has utility function
푢 푓푖 (Ξ, 푡) = 푣 푓푖 (Ξ) +
∑
휔 ∈Ω푓
푡휔 ,
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where
푣 푓1 (∅) = 푣 푓2 (∅) = 0
푣 푓1 ({휁 }) = 푣 푓1 ({휓 }) = 1
푣 푓1 ({휁 ,휓 }) = −∞
푣 푓2 ({휁 }) = 푣 푓2 ({휓 }) = −∞
푣 푓2 ({휁 ,휓 }) = 1.
Note that trades 휁 and휓 are not complementary for rm 푓1,which implies that 푓1’s preferences are not fully substitutable.
The no-trade outcome ∅ is stable, as no non-empty set of contracts is individually rational for both 푓1 and 푓2 .
However, the trail ((휁 , 0), (휓, 0)) locally blocks the outcome ∅. Thus, the no-trade outcome is stable but not trail-stable.
